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I. INTRODUCTION
“Mother, go back up into your quarters, and take up your own
work, the loom and the distaff . . . speech will be the business of men, all
men, and of me most of all; for mine is the power in this household.”
~Telemachus to Penelope 1
“What we need is some old fashioned consciousness-raising about
what we mean by the voice of authority and how we’ve come to construct
it.”
~ Mary Beard 2
Moot court exercises are as old as legal education itself. Oral
argument of fictitious cases as a pedagogical tool seems to have originated
in the English Inns of Court beginning in the sixteenth century. 3 The
earliest American law schools used moot-court exercises to teach both
advocacy and substantive law, and Harvard—the first university school of
law in the United States—continued that tradition. 4 And much of the
advice moot court provides on dress, demeanor, and delivery is older still,
originating in the Classical rhetoric of ancient Greece and Rome. 5
Today, virtually every law school includes moot court in its
curriculum, whether as a required first-year course, as an upper-division

1. Mary Beard, The Public Voice of Women, 36 LONDON REV. OF BOOKS 1 (2014),
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n06/mary-beard/the-public-voice-of-women
[http://perma.cc/3X3Q59SG] (citing HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, BOOK 1).
2. Id. at 11.
3. See Jeffrey D. Jackson & David R. Cleveland, Legal Writing: A History from the Colonial
Era to the End of the Civil War, 19 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 191 (2014). See also JAMES DIMITRI,
MELISSA GREIPP & SUSIE SALMON, THE MOOT COURT ADVISOR’S HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR LAW
STUDENTS, FACULTY, AND PRACTITIONERS 5 (2015) (explaining the history of moot court).
4. DIMITRI, GREIPP & SALMON, supra note 3, at 6. See also Jackson & Cleveland, supra note
3, at 208-12 (discussing Harvard’s use of the moot-court model to supply practical legal and skills
training).
5. See Daphne O’Regan, Eying the Body to Find Truth: How Classical Rhetoric’s Rules for
Demeanor Distort and Sustain Our Legal Regime, 37 PACE L. REV. 379 (2016).
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elective, or as an extra-curricular activity. 6 Not only is moot court a rite
of passage for lawyers, it is also an invaluable pedagogical tool, helping
law students to build skills in collaboration and teamwork, foster nimble
thinking, develop professional identity, practice professionalism, exercise
critical-thinking skills, and deepen learning in areas of substantive law. 7
But moot court has a dark side. Although well intentioned, the ways
in which we traditionally coach oral argument, counsel students on
general presentation and advocacy skills, prepare moot-court judges to
assess arguments, provide feedback during competition rounds, and praise
competition winners may reinforce and perpetuate biases that inhibit
women from succeeding and advancing in, or even remaining in, the legal
profession. 8 By reinforcing longstanding and exclusionary stereotypes
regarding the traits that make an effective advocate and the traits that
make an effective lawyer, moot-court programs may inadvertently help
cement the implicit bias that impedes greater diversity and equality of
access in the legal profession.
Little has changed in both moot court and the legal profession since
Professor Mairi Morrison first attacked this issue over 20 years ago in her
article, May It Please Whose Court?: How Moot Court Perpetuates
Gender Bias in the “Real World” of Practice, 9 and her advice on how to
teach moot court from a feminist perspective still holds. 10 In fact, most
programs likely long ago implemented many of her suggestions, such as
eradicating gender-based and racially-based language, striving to make
judging panels more diverse, and including more diverse examples when
highlighting great advocates. 11 Yet, more than 20 years after Morrison’s
article, moot-court faculty and students across the country still report
instances of biased judging and feedback eerily similar to those Morrison
detailed in 1995. 12 And more than 20 years after Morrison’s article, the
legal profession—particularly the highest-paying and most prestigious
sectors of the legal profession—has made dismal progress in increasing
6. See, e.g., A.B.A. National Appellate Advocacy Competition, U. OF ARIZONA JAMES E.
ROGERS COLLEGE OF LAW, https://law.arizona.edu/aba-national-appellate-advocacy-competition
[http://perma.cc/ME2K-ZPCB] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
7. See DIMITRI, GREIPP & SALMON, supra note 3, at 8-17.
8. These methods can have a similarly pernicious effect on students of color, students with
disabilities, students that are LGBTQ+, and students of non-Judeo-Christian religions, and that is a
serious issue worthy of additional discussion in several additional articles. This Article, however,
focuses primarily on the impact on women.
9. Mairi N. Morrison, May It Please Whose Court?: How Moot Court Perpetuates Gender
Bias in the “Real World” of Practice, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 49 (1995).
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra Part III.
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the numbers of women and other traditionally underrepresented groups. It
seems, then, that more remains to be done.
This Article suggests that many of the ways in which law schools
teach students how to be effective advocates also reinforce a paradigm of
the male as the archetypal “good lawyer,” and that paradigm, in turn, feeds
the implicit bias that causes many of the inequalities and injustices in the
legal profession. The Article then proposes some changes that moot-court
programs and moot-court competitions can make to stop contributing to
the problem. Part II briefly documents the continuing existence of bias
and barriers to ascent in the legal profession. Part III discusses law
schools’ longtime—and, at one time, entirely intentional—contributions
to inequality in the legal profession. Part III also illuminates how some of
the ways we teach, coach, and judge moot court—particularly those
inspired by the values of Classical rhetoric—continue to privilege style
and demeanor traditionally associated with males, and it illustrates this
phenomenon both with examples from articles and texts about how to
succeed in moot court and with testimony from the moot-court trenches.
Part IV highlights two psychological theories—mindset theory and
stereotype threat—and explores the ways in which those theories may
illuminate challenges and opportunities for mitigating the impact of
implicit bias. Part V highlights some of the barriers to change, and Part
VI proposes concrete solutions to the problem, including teaching “critical
moot court” to students, faculty, and volunteer judges to increase
awareness of the implicit bias that underlies much of the conventional—
and Classical—wisdom about what makes a good advocate and a good
lawyer.

II. CONTINUING BARRIERS TO ASCENT IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION FOR
WOMEN AND OTHER NON-TRADITIONAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE
PROFESSION 13
A.

1995: Mairi Morrison’s Moot Court

In 1995, Mairi Morrison published her article, May It Please Whose
Court?: How Moot Court Perpetuates Gender Bias in the “Real World”
13. This Article—like Morrison’s original piece—primarily focuses on issues facing women.
But this Article also seeks to highlight for further research and discussion the additional barriers and
difficulties that women of color, women with disabilities, LGBTQ women, and women of non-JudeoChristian faiths face. The theory of intersectionality, first named by Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw,
acknowledges that women of color confront additional and different biases and obstacles because
they are both female and not white. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
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of Practice, identifying the problem of gender bias in moot court, tying it
to gender bias in the profession, and proposing an agenda for reform. 14
Morrison—who was teaching first-year moot court and serving as faculty
advisor for two moot-court teams at the time—began her piece with three
“vignettes” illustrating the gender bias that permeated the moot-court
experience in 1995 and teasing out the dilemma women face: to
accommodate prejudice or to rail against it and suffer the consequences. 15
In the first vignette, a female student approaches Morrison regarding
a rumor that women would be graded down for wearing pantsuits to mootcourt arguments. 16 Although Morrison disabuses the student of that
notion, she remains troubled by the highly gendered nature of law-school
dress-code advice. 17 In the second vignette, a judge at competition spends
the post-argument feedback session providing comments about dress
code, demeanor, and delivery directed “just to the girls,” including
admonishing women that cocking their heads to one side—which some
could interpret as a listening posture—was too “cutesy.” 18 In the third
vignette, Morrison watches as three highly capable but traditionally
attractive and feminine female competitors are relegated to consolation
prizes in a male-dominated Sports Law competition, whereas another
team—”three pretty women from the South”—receive courtly treatment
from male judges as the team advances through a Family Law
competition. 19 Morrison also cited similar examples from a study
conducted by the Chicago Bar Association’s Alliance for Women,
including one judge’s withering admonishment that “[t]his is not Gidget
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; see also Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241,
1244 (1991). Race “is not merely an added layer that makes them subject to additional challenges,
but rather a component of their identity that intersects with gender to expose them to unique
challenges.” Carla D. Pratt, Sisters in Law: Black Women Lawyers’ Struggle for Advancement, 2012
MICH. ST. L. REV. 1777, 1779. Gender and disability, gender and sexuality, gender and religion,
gender and poverty, really gender and any of a variety of identities (or combinations of multiple
identities) also intersect to create different challenges for different women. E.g., Kozue Kay Nagata,
Gender and Disability in the Arab Region: The Challenges in the New Millennium, 14 ASIA PAC.
DISABILITY REHAB. J. 10 (2003); Asma Lateef, Gender Inequality and Poverty, HUFFINGTON POST
BLOG (Apr. 21, 2015, 12:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/asma-lateef/gender-inequalityand-poverty_b_7099856.html [http://perma.cc/JR69-25BU]. This Article will touch briefly on the
ways in which the male paradigm particularly excludes women of color, women with disabilities, and
women with other intersecting identities.
14. Morrison, supra note 9.
15. Id. at 58-66.
16. Id. at 58-59.
17. Id. at 59-60.
18. Id. at 62-63.
19. Id. at 64-65.
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Goes to Law School.” 20 In recounting these vignettes, Morrison
highlighted the fine line female advocates had to walk in 1995: “distract”
the court with reminders that you are a woman, and risk not being taken
seriously; behave too much like a man, and risk alienating your audience
by being “strident” or “bitchy.” 21
Morrison then analyzed the moot-court dilemma through the prism
of three schools of feminism—first-stage/equal rights feminism, secondstage/difference feminism, and third-stage/postmodern feminism, and
identified the strengths and failings of each approach. 22 The current
approach to moot court, Morrison judged, followed the model of equality
feminism in training women to be more like men and to suppress any
“distracting” feminine traits. 23 This model both reinforces the notion of
feminine traits as non-lawyerly distractions and sets up women—who
cannot, after all, be men, and who may not be able to calibrate their
approximation of masculine behavior perfectly to suit every audience—
to fail. 24 The difference model, instead, would value stereotypically
female traits and mannerisms and therefore counsel women to embrace
feminine dress, demeanor, and delivery to the extent that they were
genuine. 25 This model, Morrison noted, might disadvantage students
when they enter the real world, where principled choices to defy
stereotypes may have serious consequences.26 The postmodern model
would challenge the very notion of gendered traits as detrimental to
women working in traditionally masculine areas. 27 Instead, in order to
succeed, female advocates must adopt a sort of behavioral bilingualism,
subverting the male paradigm from within by wearing its costumes and
speaking with its voice, while simultaneously promoting more holistic and
egalitarian values and beliefs. 28
Morrison ultimately advanced ten recommendations for reforming
moot court and teaching it from a feminist perspective. 29 Many of her
recommendations were in the vein of teaching the controversy: exposing
students to feminist jurisprudence; highlighting flaws in traditional,
precedent-heavy reasoning and providing examples of successful
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 67.
Id. at 59-60.
Id. at 68-78.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 74.
Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 75-77.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 81-83.
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alternative techniques; explicitly recognizing the ethical issues involved
in presenting an argument from a particular perspective; 30 continuing to
eradicate gender- and racially-biased language; and deliberate
consciousness-raising about gender bias and how it affects all participants
in the justice system. 31 She also stressed the importance of diversity in
judges, teachers, and models, posited that both male and female advocates
should be taught to move smoothly between different argument styles, and
urged deemphasizing stereotypical dress norms. 32 Finally, she argued for
improving the status of those who teach moot court, suggesting that
providing such professors with security and academic freedom would
better enable them to do the hard work that needed to be done in reforming
moot court and, by extension, the legal profession itself. 33 The suggestions
I make in Section VI build on Professor Morrison’s suggestions, but they
also move into new areas, providing targeted suggestions drawn from
psychological research regarding fixed mindset theory and stereotype
threat theory, as well as detailed, practical advice for those administering
interscholastic moot-court competitions.
B.

Moot Court—and the Legal Profession—in the 21st Century

Many moot-court programs have adopted a number of Morrison’s
suggestions—selecting more diverse examples and role models, inviting
more diverse judges, encouraging somewhat more diverse argument
styles. In some ways, however, little has changed in moot court or the
legal profession since 1995. Although certainly women and other
historically marginalized groups have made significant inroads into the
legal profession over the past few decades, white men still dominate the
top tiers of the profession, and progress seems to have stagnated. “The
ceiling may be shattered, but the pipeline to power remains elusive for
most women.” 34 Although women have made up more than 40% of lawschool graduates since the mid-1980s, as of 2004, women made up a mere

30. This Article deliberately leaves aside some of the issues that Morrison raises about whether
other values of law practice in the United States—heavy reliance on precedent, eschewing appeals to
emotion or other values, the adversarial system, and others—affect the position of women in the legal
profession. These issues are both fascinating and significant but are outside the intended scope of this
Article.
31. Morrison, supra note 9, at 81-83.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 83.
34. Hannah Brenner & Renee Newman Knake, Gender and the Legal Profession’s Pipeline to
Power, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2012).
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15% of equity partners in law firms. 35 As of 2015, women still comprise
only 16.8% of equity partners. 36
Particularly where subjective decision-making comes into play,
women—and women of color, in particular—still fare relatively poorly in
the legal profession. Even where women ascend to equity partnership, law
firms seem to value their work less than that of their male peers. Although
women bill comparable hours to their male counterparts, female lawyers
at big firms earn 32% of what their male peers earn. 37 Even where women
originate the same amount of business as their male counterparts, the men
still earn more—sometimes a startling amount more. 38 And billing rates,
which are set by firm executive committees with input from the heads of
offices and practice groups, further highlight this disparity in how firms
value the work of female lawyers: firms bill out their female partners’
work at an average of $47 per hour less than they bill the work of
equivalent male partners. 39 Women seldom ascend to the ranks of the top
billers. 40 Ninety-six percent of AmLaw 100 firms report that their most
highly compensated partner is male. 41 Law firms seem to know that this
is a problem; in the 2014 survey by the National Association of Women
Lawyers, a significant majority of firms refused to report compensation
data by gender. 42
This disparity is not isolated to big firms. As of 2012, only 27.1% of
state and federal judges were women. 43 Although women make up 66.2%
of Assistant Deans, they comprise only 20.6% of Deans. 44 Only 22.6% of
general counsel at Fortune 500 companies are women. 45 And the select
circle of advocates who argue before the Supreme Court of the United
States (SCOTUS)—arguably the Holy Grail of appellate-advocacy
35. Julie Triedman, A Few Good Women, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (June 2015), at 39;
Stephanie A. Scharf, Roberta Liebenberg & Christine Amalfe, Report of the Eighth Annual NAWL
National Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law Firms, NAT’L ASS’N OF WOMEN
LAWYERS 4 (Feb. 2014) [hereinafter NAWL].
36. Triedman, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. NAWL, supra note 35, at 11.
42. NAWL, supra note 35, at 4. Only 48 firms in the AmLaw 200 provided any data on
compensation of equity partners. Id. at 10.
43. Dina Refki et al., Women in Federal and State-Level Judgeships, A REPORT BY THE CTR.
FOR WOMEN IN GOV’T & CIVIL SOC’Y, ROCKEFELLER COLL. OF PUB. AFFAIRS & POL’Y, UNIV. AT
ALBANY, STATE UNIV. OF N.Y. 1 (2012).
44. A.B.A., COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE
LAW 4 (July 2014).
45. Triedman, supra note 35.
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competitions—is overwhelmingly male, even in 2016. 46 In the last term,
women lawyers argued only 23% of the cases that appeared before
SCOTUS, which is actually an improvement over the recent average of
18%. 47 Of the 66 lawyers most likely to have their clients’ cases heard by
SCOTUS—dubbed the “elite” lawyers in a recent Reuters investigation—
only eight are women. 48 And of the 56 advocates invited by SCOTUS to
present amicus arguments on behalf of parties who have declined to
participate in the proceedings or are unable to retain counsel, only 10%
were women; of these, all but one came after 2010. 49
The statistics are even bleaker for women of color. “There is little
question that minority women—compared to white men, white women
and minority men—face the most daunting obstacles to advancement in
law firms.” 50 Fifty percent of minority attorneys leave their law firms
within the first three years, and 75% leave within the first four, whereas
the overall attrition rate is 43% after three years and 55.6% after four. 51
Only 2% of equity partners are women of color. 52 “Indeed, various reports
over the past 10 years show that virtually no progress has been made by
the nation’s largest firms in advancing minority partners and particularly
minority women partners into the highest ranks of firms.” 53 And of the 66
“elite” Supreme Court lawyers, three are non-white. 54 Only 5% of amicus
invitations go to non-white lawyers. 55

46. Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Specialists, Mostly Male, Dominated Arguments This Term,
NAT’L L.J. (May 11, 2016), http://www.law.com/supremecourtbrief/almID/1202757437432/
[http://perma.cc/8L5K-N4EU].
47. Chris White, Lawyers Appointed to Argue Supreme Court Cases are Overwhelmingly
NEWZ
(May
16,
2016,
1:33
PM),
White
Males,
Study
Finds,
LAW
http://lawnewz.com/uncategorized/lawyers-appointed-to-argue-supreme-court-cases-areoverwhelming-white-males-study-finds/ [http://perma.cc/MP4U-6SFE].
48. Joan Biskupic et al., At America’s Court of Last Resort, a Handful of Lawyers Now
REUTERS
(Dec.
8,
2014,
10:30
AM),
Dominates
the
Docket,
THOMSON
http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/scotus/ [http://perma.cc/5TLK-VBMF]. And of
the 66, 51 work for big law firms of the type that routinely fail to value the contributions of female
lawyers equally. Id.
49. Katherine Shaw, Friends of the Court: Evaluating the Supreme Court’s Amicus Invitations,
101 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1583 (2016) (“The current approach permits the Justices to dole out the
valuable asset of a Supreme Court argument to friends and former employees, in a way that is
reminiscent of the cronyism and patronage that characterized government employment” before the
Civil Service reforms of the 19th century.).
50. NAWL, supra note 35, at 15.
51. Luis J. Diaz & Patrick C. Dunican Jr., Ending the Revolving Door Syndrome in Law, 41
SETON HALL L. REV. 947, 949 (2011).
52. NAWL, supra note 35, at 6.
53. NAWL, supra note 35, at 16 (citing various studies conducted between 2004 and 2013).
54. Biskupic et al., supra note 48.
55. White, supra note 47.
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This problem is not limited to the legal profession, of course—
although half of the overall workforce is women, women make up only
3.5% of corporate CEOs, 14% of executive managers, and 12.5% of
corporate directors—but on average, women fare worse in the legal
profession than they do in other sectors. 56
Although the reasons that people leave the legal profession or fail (or
choose not) to reach its top echelons are complex, 57 cognitive biases that
reinforce pernicious stereotypes of women and of the traits that make a
persuasive advocate or a good attorney contribute to the problem. 58
Despite progress—having three women on the Supreme Court of the
United States at the same time is certainly an excellent start, for
example—”inequities remain, often lurking in difficult-to-articulate
domains of implicit bias and stereotyping.” 59
At minimum, gender stereotypes are “an important factor explaining
the glass ceiling effect and the underrepresentation of women lawyers in
prestigious segments of the legal profession.” 60 Particularly where
subjective decision-making comes into play—for example, compensation
decisions, decisions about billable rates, and performance reviews—there
is little question that stereotypes come into play. “Women do not share

56. Ronit Dinovitzer & John Hagan, Hierarchical Structure and Gender Dissimilarity in
American Legal Labor Markets, 92 SOC. FORCES 929 (Mar. 2014). The legal profession itself recently
acknowledged the pernicious persistence of bias in the profession. In August 2016, the American Bar
Association formally adopted revised Resolution 109, which amends its Model Rule 8.4 to include
discrimination or harassment on the basis of “race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability,
age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or socioeconomic status” in the definition of
professional misconduct that will subject an attorney to discipline. A.B.A., Report to the House of
Delegates, Res. 109 (Aug. 2016). The comments to the new Model Rule explicitly provide that it
covers workplace discrimination and harassment. Id. In its report endorsing the adoption of
Resolution 109, a coalition of A.B.A. commissions and committees that included the Commission on
Women in the Profession noted that female lawyers report experiencing the effects of gender bias in
their careers. Id.
57. Commentators posit several factors that may contribute to this disparity. For example,
some argue that fewer women aspire to leadership positions than do men. This lack of aspiration, of
course, may be the result of longstanding barriers to women’s advancement, such as lack of adequate
child care options, lack of social and familial support, and the difficulties of advancing in a workplace
permeated by gender bias, among other barriers. Others emphasize gender stereotypes in the
workplace, which prevent women from “receiving the work opportunities that would allow them to
showcase their skills and earn promotion.” Pratt, supra note 13, at 1778-79.
58. Brenner & Knake, supra note 34, at 1423.
59. Brenner & Knake, supra note 34, at 1424.
60. Hannah Brenner & Renee Newman Knake, Rethinking Gender Equality in the Legal
Profession’s Pipeline to Power: A Study on Media Coverage of the Supreme Court Nominees (Phase
I, The Introduction Week), 84 TEMP. L. REV. 325, 340 (2012) (citing Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and
Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies, Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large
Law Firms, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2274 (2010)).
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the presumption of competence held by men.” 61 Assumptions that women
lawyers will be less assertive, less committed to clients, less hardworking, and less competitive lead reviewers and clients to latch onto
objective facts that confirm those stereotypes rather than more numerous
and significant facts that undermine them. 62
III. LAW SCHOOL’S CONTRIBUTION TO GENDER INEQUALITY
Although we cannot place responsibility for gender bias in the legal
profession solely at the doorstep of law schools, law schools have long
contributed to the problem. That law is an elitist profession is hardly a
surprise to most, but it is also fair to say that U.S. university law schools
were founded in part to exclude women and religious, ethnic, and racial
minorities. At their beginnings, university law schools stood in contrast to
the more democratic means of entering the profession: “reading the law,”
which was the dominant mode of entry into the profession in the United
States in the first half of the nineteenth century. 63 When universityaffiliated law schools emerged later in the 1800s, they targeted a more
affluent, upper-class audience, and they instituted mechanisms to exclude
immigrants, members of racial, ethnic, or religious minorities, and
women. 64 When more accessible schools arose, providing legal-education
opportunities for a more diverse population, products of the elite
university schools decried graduates of those schools—primarily
immigrants or members of minority groups or lower socioeconomic
classes—as not just unqualified but unethical. 65
Although law schools are certainly less overt in these types of
exclusionary tactics now, this inequality persists today, in the form of lawschool rankings, class rank, admissions tests that disfavor certain groups,
values communicated by some law-school career offices, biases in faculty
hiring, and a general disdain for any education that seems too practical.66
And law schools continue to elevate the upper-class, Anglo, Protestant
male ideal in a variety of ways, 67 not least of all through moot court.

61.
62.

Brenner & Knake, supra note 34, at 1423.
Wald, supra note 60, at 2256, n.55 (citing A.B.A. COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE
PROFESSION, THE UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 14 (2001)).
63. Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools Reproduce
Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1175-76 (2008).
64. Id. at 1177.
65. Id. at 1177-79.
66. Id. at 1202-07.
67. Id. at 1178-87, 1190, 1198, 1220.
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Good Lawyers Look and Sound Like Men

Moot court often is one of the first opportunities that law students
have to experience what it feels like to act and sound like a lawyer. Most
law schools include some sort of moot-court-type activity in the first year,
whether it be just a small part of the first-year legal-writing curriculum, a
full-blown moot-court class, or an intramural competition. 68
Much of what law schools teach about dress, demeanor, and delivery
in moot court and other advocacy courses hearkens back to techniques of
Classical rhetoric. 69 And most of those techniques derive from the notion
that the demeanor and delivery of the military leader or warrior—always
a man—carries the most credibility and persuasive power. 70
This demeanor includes what modern advocacy experts style the
“neutral stance”: feet approximately shoulder-width apart, hands at sides,
with highly controlled, if any, gesturing. 71 According to Aristotle, “a
strong and manly posture derived from armed conflict or, at least, the
gymnasium” (as opposed to the bent and servile posture more suited for
slave labor) quite literally embodies rationality. 72 Under the rules of
Classical rhetoric, a credible, authoritative speaking voice is low,
controlled, and resonant; a high voice, by contrast, signifies lack of
emotional self-control, irrationality, and lack of authority. 73 A speaker
who shuns or is unable to emulate elite stance and delivery relegates
himself to parity with “the insane, female, poor, children, slaves, the
powerless”: in other words, the irrational and untrustworthy. 74
Female speech was considered inherently untrustworthy under the
Classical paradigm. 75 Women, ruled by their wombs and the hysteria

68. See generally Standard 305(a), A.B.A. Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of
Law Schools 18 (2015).
69. See generally O’Regan, supra note 5.
70. Id. at 387 (“The dominant elite tradition successfully imposed aristocratic, upper-class
demeanor, including the physical habits of wealthy foot soldiers, as natural and linked to rationality
and truth.”).
71. Id. at 388 (citing Leonard Matheo & Lisa DeCaro, The Eleven Most Frequently Asked
Questions about Courtroom Presentation and Performance, THE PRACTICAL LITIGATOR 17, 30 (Sept.
1999)).
72. O’Regan, supra note 5, at 393.
73. Id. at 403, n.120-22.
74. Id. at 399 (citing Joy Connolly, The Politics of Rhetorical Education, in CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO ANCIENT RHETORIC 135 (Erik Gunderson ed., 2009)) (“Cicero and Quintilian are
policeman of behavior and style, encouraging students to cultivate a ‘naturally’ masculine attitude,
and punishing those who had the look and sounds of the slave, the foreigner, the ill-educated man, or
the woman.”).
75. O’Regan, supra note 5, at 401, n.104.
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those organs caused, spoke from untrustworthy motives. 76 And speech
that mirrored women’s speech—particularly “shrill” or “shrieking” tones
reflecting lack of emotional control—conveyed a speaker’s lack of
credibility. 77
In fact, the very notion of a woman speaking in the public sphere—
much less on issues relating to law or politics—violated the Classical
social code. As Classicist Mary Beard notes, “public speaking and oratory
were not merely things that ancient women didn’t do: they were exclusive
practices and skills that defined masculinity as a gender.” 78 In the
Classical view, women could not adapt their private speech—largely
focused on domestic matters—to the “lofty idiom” of law and politics. 79
When a woman did insert herself into the public forum, she could be seen
two ways: as an “androgyne,” hiding a “man’s nature” behind her
woman’s form, or as an “unnatural freak,” irritating her audience with her
“impudent” “yapping.” 80 As Beard observes, a “woman speaking in
public was, in most circumstances, by definition not a woman.” 81 To the
extent that the rare woman could be accepted as a speaker in the public
sphere, her role and subject matter were limited: she could speak on her
own behalf as a victim, or she could speak to defend her home and
family. 82 She could not speak for men. 83
The goal of the elite speaker was invisibility: “The speakers who are
within the elite norm disappear; they leave behind what looks like
disembodied speech.” 84 Deviations from this elite norm distract from the
message. And women and members of other non-elite groups have less
freedom to deviate. 85
B.

To Be or Not to Be . . . Feminine?

According to conventional wisdom, appellate argument of the type
practiced in most moot-court competitions calls for the elite dress,

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Beard, supra note 1.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. O’Regan, supra note 5, at 416.
85. Id. at 419, 427, 429 (“By making the wrong gesture, the advocate slips backward into the
non-legal world, of the body, deception, particularity, emotionality, irrationality, and finally, insanity.
This is a particular danger for women and other non-elite groups. Their precarious position requires
them to be constantly vigilant in the presentation of a rational, elite self.”).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

13

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 4

156

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:143

demeanor, and delivery of the warrior rhetorician. 86 And, as modern
moot-court wisdom would have it, the voice of authority is still a deep and
resonant one. No lesser authorities than U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Antonin Scalia and noted legal-writing expert Bryan Garner advise
advocates to spend time on efforts to lower their vocal pitch, opining that
“a high and shrill tone does not inspire confidence.” 87 Scalia and Garner
hardly stand alone; advice about lowering vocal register pervades books
and articles on effective oral advocacy. 88 Even those oral-advocacy
experts who explicitly acknowledge the sexism that may underlie the
connection between low voices and authority nonetheless counsel
advocates to speak in the lower end of their vocal range. Alan Dworsky,
for example, in his excellent The Little Book on Oral Argument, counsels:
“Speak at a pitch in the lower end of your range. If sexism is the cause of
the general perception that low voices have more authority than high
voices, then perhaps as women occupy more positions of power this rule
will change.” 89 And many of the texts warn of the consequences of a
86. Id. at 422. This Article deliberately leaves aside the question of whether the focus on
appellate advocacy—which dominates the world of legal-skills competition and even the curriculum
of first-year legal writing programs—exacerbates the problem. See LEGAL WRITING INST., ASS’N OF
LEGAL WRITING DIRS., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY 13 (2014) (demonstrating
that out of 176 schools reporting, 125 taught appellate argument, compared with 84 that taught
pretrial-motion argument and 45 that taught trial-motion argument, and no school taught trial
advocacy in the first year).
87. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING
JUDGES 143 (West Publishing Co. 2008).
88. See, e.g., CELIA W. CHILDRESS, PERSUASIVE DELIVERY IN THE COURTROOM 320 (Lawyers
Cooperative Pub. 1995) (quoted in BRYAN GARNER, THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT: ENDURING
PRINCIPLES WITH SUPPORTING COMMENTS FROM THE LITERATURE 21 (Thomson/West 2009))
[hereinafter THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT] (“There is no doubt that people prefer to listen to lowpitched voices and ascribe stronger personality qualities to the low-pitched speaker.”); IAIN MORLEY,
THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: A SHORT POLEMIC ON HOW TO BE SERIOUSLY GOOD IN COURT 46 (2005)
(quoted in THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, at 21) (“Deeper voices sound more persuasive—why is
a mystery, but they just do.”); Michael J. Higdon, Oral Argument and Impression Management:
Harnessing the Power of Nonverbal Persuasion for a Judicial Audience, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 631,
652 (2009) [hereinafter Oral Argument and Impression Management] (asserting that a deeper pitch is
both more persuasive and more credible).
89. ALAN L. DWORSKY, THE LITTLE BOOK ON ORAL ARGUMENT 43 (Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1991). There is ample research suggesting that most people find deeper voices more credible and
persuasive, and it could be a result of evolution. For example, one study found that women who use
a sultry voice are better at persuading people than women with high-pitched voices. Cheng et al.,
Listen, Follow Me: Dynamic Vocal Signals of Dominance Predict Emergent Social Rank in Humans,
145(5) J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 536 (May 2016) (“[We] found that when the voice . . . goes
down in pitch, people judge the person as wanting to be more influential, more powerful, more
intimidating or more domineering . . . . Our study adds to the evidence that humans, like many other
animals, use their voices to signal and assert dominance over others.”); How to Use Voice Pitch to
Influence Others in Seconds, PSYBLOG (Apr. 21, 2016), http://www.spring.org.uk/2016/04/how-touse-voice-pitch-to-influence-others-in-seconds.php [http://perma.cc/RY2F-W6RB]. Another study
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higher pitch, which range from simply being annoying to being less
persuasive and less credible. 90
Women must walk a particularly fine vocal line: Their voices, like
men’s, must be “low in pitch, loud and resonant,” and “certainly a few
notes lower in register than the ordinary female voice,” but still “all
feminine.” 91 The recent handwringing in the popular media and elsewhere
about so-called “vocal fry”—which “occurs typically when speakers
lower their vocal pitch to the lowest register they are capable of
producing” 92—illustrates the confounding contours of this advice: women
who lower their voices too unnaturally, or who lower their voices
irregularly or for emphasis, may be perceived as even less professional,
credible, and persuasive than those who do not lower their voices at all,
conducted by Meghan Sumner, Associate Professor of Linguistics at Stanford, showed how people
preferred male voices when compared to female voices, even when the female voices were deemed
trustworthy and the male voices, on their own, were deemed unreliable or unintelligent. See Vivian
Giang, How Unconscious Bias is Affecting Our Ability to Listen, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 8, 2016, 5:04
AM),
https://www.fastcompany.com/3063218/how-unconscious-bias-is-affecting-our-ability-tolisten [http://perma.cc/CVJ4-HHEJ] (discussing Professor Sumner’s findings). Of course, this
unconscious bias may only be reinforced in law schools. But, as Professor Jennifer Romig points out,
by acknowledging that we have subconscious stereotypes, we may start to change them, especially in
the legal profession.
[One] overarching fundamental legal skill is the ability to effectively assess and respond
to the perspective of the recipient of the communication. This requires inclusive listening.
Inclusive listening makes other people feel valued and understood. When listening to others most of us tend to assume we understand and we reach conclusions based on our point
of view and our implicit biases. Inclusive listening doesn’t make assumptions. It requires
one to actively engage in critical thinking: notice and question our assumptions, and recognize that assumptions are not truths.
Jennifer Romig, Inclusive Listening: Pushing Through Bias and Assumptions, LISTEN LIKE A
LAWYER (Oct. 3, 2016), https://listenlikealawyer.com/2016/10/03/inclusive-listening-pushingthrough-bias-and-assumptions/ [http://perma.cc/R8BS-RAE4].
90. See, e.g., Hon. Yvonne Kauger (as quoted in RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, WINNING ON APPEAL
325 (1992)) (“Don’t whine. This applies to both sexes . . . . Take a deep breath and lower your
register.”); CHILDRESS, supra note 88, at 346 (quoted in THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, supra note
88, at 21) (“High-pitched voices irritate more people than you can imagine.”); Jean Johnson
Spearman, General Communication Skills, in MASTER ADVOCATES’ HANDBOOK 285, 297 (D. Lake
Rumsey ed., 1986) (“Some voices are naturally higher pitched than others. If the voice is too high and
lacks variety, it can become annoying to your audience.”); MORLEY, supra note 88, at 46 (quoted in
THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, supra note 88, at 21) (“Tinny, light voices can sound plaintive,
weak, sometimes desperate, appear to be shouts, sound out of control, and finally and most
importantly, are difficult to listen to, and so in the end they can be ignored.”).
91. CHILDRESS, supra note 88, at 297, 348 (quoted in THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, supra
note 88, at 18, 22).
92. Vocal fry is described as “a voice quality accompanied by creaking, cracking, and popping
noises.” Rindy C. Anderson et al., Vocal Fry May Undermine the Success of Young Women in the
Labor Market, PLOS ONE (2014) (cited in Michael J. Higdon, Oral Advocacy and Vocal Fry: The
Unseemly, Sexist Side of Nonverbal Persuasion, 13 JALWD 1, 3 (2016) [hereinafter Oral Advocacy
and Vocal Fry]).
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and certainly as less professional, credible, or persuasive than men who
employ the same technique. 93
Like the deep, resonant voice, the warrior stance also lives on in
modern moot-court advice. Dworsky even explicitly ties it to the notion
of strength, counseling advocates that “[y]our stance should be as solid as
your argument. Face the judges squarely, with legs straight and both feet
planted firmly on the floor about shoulder-width apart. Keep your head up
and your back straight. An upright stance suggests honesty and
strength.” 94 Some variation of this same advice appeared—sometimes
multiple times—in virtually every book or article on oral advocacy that
this author consulted, including those texts that spent little time on matters
of demeanor and style. 95 One writer even confessed that the moot-court
program at a law school at which he previously worked had codified this
warrior bearing as the “Stetson Stance”: “The Moot Court people at that
law school teach students to approach the podium, spread their legs further
apart than their shoulders, and grasp the podium to center themselves.” 96
Similarly, like the Classical speaker, modern moot-court advocates
are counseled to strive for invisibility lest their words be lost amongst
distractions. Attire should not draw attention to itself or to the advocate’s
body, even (or especially) if that body is appealing. 97 Advocates are
93. Oral Advocacy and Vocal Fry, supra note 92, at 6 (“[A]mong speakers using vocal fry,
women are perceived more negatively than men.”). Indeed, one 2014 study found that young women
using vocal fry are perceived as “less competent, less educated, less trustworthy, less attractive, and
less hirable.” Oral Advocacy and Vocal Fry, supra note 92, at 5 (citing Anderson et al., supra note
92).
94. DWORSKY, supra note 89, at 38-39.
95. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 87, at 165 (“stand erect”) and 183 (“stand up
straight and speak your piece”); DAVID C. FREDERICK, THE ART OF ORAL ADVOCACY 137
(Thomson/West 2003) (“an advocate should strive to achieve a professional posture, standing straight
and tall to argue . . . .”); Id. at 191 (explaining that professional demeanor includes erect posture);
Gerald Lebovits, Drew Gewuerz & Christopher Hunker, Winning the Moot Court Oral Argument: A
Guide for Intramural and Intermural Moot Court Competitors, 41 CAP. U. L. REV. 887, 917 (2013)
(“ [Advocates] should stand erect with both feet on the ground approximately shoulder length apart.”);
Id. at 919 (“[A]dvocates should stand with both feet straight and on the ground. Their feet should be
even with their shoulders.”); Oral Argument and Impression Management, supra note 88, at 643-44
(explaining that posture should be non-rigid but erect and confident); Id. at 657 (quoting BRADLEY
G. CLARY ET AL., ADVOCACY ON APPEAL 116 (2001) (“[P]lant your feet squarely on the ground and
stand in one position.”)); James D. Dimitri, Stepping Up to the Podium with Confidence: A Primer
for Law Students on Preparing and Delivering an Appellate Oral Argument, 38 STETSON L. REV. 75,
103 (2008) (“Your posture at the podium should be even. Stand up straight and face the bench. Do
not stand leaning on one leg, and do not shift your weight from one leg to the other.”).
96. Ronald J. Rychlak, Effective Appellate Advocacy: Tips from the Teams, 66 MISS. L.J. 527,
534 (1997).
97. DWORSKY, supra note 89, at 38 (“The guiding principle of dressing for oral argument is
not to wear anything that draws attention to itself or your body . . . . [Y]ou are not allowed to use your
body’s beauty to influence the judges.”); see also Lebovits et al., supra note 95, at 916 (asserting that
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warned that everything from too many gestures, too few gestures, poorly
timed gestures, gestures at the wrong height, improper vocal volume, and
inappropriate vocal inflections could distract the court from the substance
of even the most masterfully reasoned and worded argument. 98
Even advice not so closely tied to the values of Classical rhetoric
tends to favor dress, demeanor, and delivery associated with white men.
Dworsky puts it most bluntly in talking about courtroom appearance:
“[J]udges . . . tend to trust people who look like them.” 99 More than one
source suggests that short hair lends an advocate more credibility, whether
that advocate be male or female. 100 Women are counseled to wear updos
if they are unwilling to cut their hair. 101 Long hair, at least in American
culture, is more commonly associated with femininity, and, indeed, with
female sexual attractiveness. 102 Vocal tics associated with women,
including uptalk, 103 vocal fry, 104 and tag questions, 105 all draw
disapproval. And the head tilt that one of the judges in Morrison’s article
characterized as offensively “cutesy” when coming from a woman seems
attire should be conservative and not distracting); Coleen M. Barger, How to Make the Losing Oral
Argument, ARK. LAW. 16 (2006) (To make the losing argument, “wear the kind of clothing or jewelry
that will attract the Court’s attention.”).
98. See, e.g., Hon. Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Ruminations from the Bench: Brief Writing and Oral
Argument in the Fifth Circuit, 70 TUL. L. REV. 187, 205 (1995) (quoted in THE WINNING ORAL
ARGUMENT, supra note 88, at 96) (“Try not to talk with your hands; that is distracting and
unprofessional . . . . Do whatever works to make your hands invisible.”); DWORSKY, supra note 89,
at 24 (stating that vocal and bodily mannerisms can be distracting); Lebovits et al., supra note 95, at
919 (explaining that too many hand gestures are distracting); Lebovits et al., supra note 95, at 920
(asserting that hand gestures higher than chest level are distracting).
99. DWORSKY, supra note 89, at 38.
100. See Oral Argument and Impression Management, supra note 88, at 654 (citing JUDEE K.
BURGOON ET AL., NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION: THE UNSPOKEN DIALOGUE 402, 449); Lebovits et
al., supra note 95, at 916 (stating that hair should be short).
101. Oral Argument and Impression Management, supra note 88, at 654 (citing TONYA
REIMAN, THE POWER OF BODY LANGUAGE: HOW TO SUCCEED IN EVERY BUSINESS AND SOCIAL
ENCOUNTER 222 (2007)) (“Ladies, long hair, worn down, no matter how nicely it is kept, no matter
how good it looks, is not usually considered professional.”).
102. See JOHN KNOWLTON & STEVEN PEARCE, HANDBOOK OF COSMETIC SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 495 (1993) (cited in Oral Advocacy and Vocal Fry, supra note 92, at 2.)
103. See Lebovits et al., supra note 95, at 921; DWORSKY, supra note 89, at 43 (“[A]void ending
a sentence with a rising inflection.”); Yana Skorobogatov, What’s Up With Upspeak?, UC BERKELEY
SOCIAL SCIENCE MATRIX (Sept. 21, 2015), http://matrix.berkeley.edu/research/whats-upspeak
[http://perma.cc/24RY-9CC4] (stating that uptalk is most often associated with female speakers).
104. From Upspeak to Vocal Fry: Are We ‘Policing’ Young Women’s Voices?, NPR (July 23,
2015, 1:49 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/23/425608745/from-upspeak-to-vocal-fry-are-wepolicing-young-womens-voices [https://perma.cc/LG3E-A6NS] (explaining that a tendency to draw
out the end of words or sentences with a low, creaky voice is associated with women, although men
also engage in those habits).
105. See Betty Lous Dubois & Isabel Crouch, The Question of Tag Questions in Women’s
Speech: They Don’t Really Use More of Them, Do They?, 4 LANGUAGE IN SOC’Y 289 (1975).
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to split the vote. According to one source, a head tilt increases credibility,
depending, of course, on the direction of that head tilt. 106
C.

Teach, Coach, Judge: A Continuation or Revival of Classical
Rhetoric Values?

Oral-argument judges and coaches often amplify the gendered (and
otherwise biased) nature of the Classical model and other conventional
wisdom about dress, delivery, and demeanor. As I noted in the
Introduction, depressingly little has changed since Mairi Morrison first
tackled this issue in 1995. Many of the anecdotes I collected from my
colleagues around the country 107 eerily echo those Morrison set forth in
her piece 20 years ago and perpetuate Classical values that privilege
white-male traits. For the most part, the days of moot-court judges who
call male advocates “Mr. [Last name]” and female advocates their first
names, 108 who reminisce sadly about the “good old days” when the
profession did not include “those people,” 109 or who change the rules of
the competition on the fly to award prizes to male advocates (after telling
the only female advocate that she gave the best oral presentation),110 are
long passed. 111 That said, two email solicitations to listservs of moot-court
and legal-writing professors quickly elicited an avalanche of examples of
coaching or feedback that reinforced the male paradigm.
Unsurprisingly, many moot-court judges and coaches cloak
gendered 112 critiques in the language of avoiding distractions from the
substance of an argument. Just as Morrison pinpointed in her article,
however, much of what conventional moot-court wisdom styles as
distractions from the substance are in fact simply deviations from the male

106. Oral Argument and Impression Management, supra note 88, at 643.
107. In all instances, these anecdotes are documented in emails on file with the author. That
said, many of the sources requested anonymity. They attend or run moot-court competitions every
year, and they value good relationships with competition administrators and with the judges they
recruit. Thus, this Article omits nonessential information from the anecdotes to preserve anonymity,
and, naturally, does not identify its sources by name.
108. See E-mail to author (Sept. 4, 2015) (on file with author).
109. See id.
110. See E-mail from J.R. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author).
111. Then again, people did disclose some shockingly archaic conduct from recent years. A
legal-writing professor reported that her student named “Chastity” was about to give her first oral
argument when one of the judges leered at her and said, “[Y]ou don’t look like a ‘Chastity.’” See Email from C.K. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author). And one judge openly commented
upon one competitor’s large breasts. See E-mail from A.H. to author (Sept. 5, 2015) (on file with
author).
112. And race-based, and heterocentric, and ableist . . . .
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norm. 113 Being notably female is distracting. Being a female of color is
especially distracting. Female advocates are routinely told that suits that
fail to disguise their large breasts or shapely figures are “distracting.” One
advocate was told to center herself more behind the podium to hide her
“distracting” breasts. 114 A woman wearing a skirt suit cut a bit above the
knee and a blouse that hinted at the existence of cleavage was told that her
clothing was “distracting.” 115 Female advocates are routinely told that
long hair is “distracting.” 116 In essence, if a female advocate looks too
much like a woman—or not enough like traditional conceptions of a
woman—moot-court judges find that extremely distracting.
Many comments reinforce the Classical notion that the only
acceptable voice for an advocate is a deep, resonant one. One coach
reported that an older, white, male judge counseled her all-female team
that women’s voices were “just too hard to listen to because they were
high and shrill” and stated that his “best advice” would be to “lower their
voices at least two octaves” so that they would not be “painful for men to
listen to.” 117 One female advocate with a soft, relatively high-pitched
voice was told she had a “baby voice” and that she “sounded like she
lacked confidence, so it was harder to take her arguments seriously.” 118
Oral-argument judges routinely devote the vast majority of their
post-argument commentary to matters of style and appearance, but that
feedback is frequently directed primarily or exclusively to women.
Multiple coaches and advocates cited the example of one older female
judge at a national competition who spent almost 15 minutes lecturing
primarily the female advocates on matters of dress. 119 Although she did
mention tie color briefly, she spent the bulk of her time warning at great
length against what she deemed to be inappropriate jewelry, hairstyles,
and blouse styles. Meanwhile, at the same competition two years earlier,
a coach observed a young male advocate who had added very
noticeable—and very artificial-looking—grey streaks in his dark hair with
a visibly powdery spray-on hair color; not a single judge on three panels
mentioned it, and overall the advocate received strong scores.120
113. Morrison, supra note 9.
114. In fairness, that judge was inebriated. See E-mail from A.H to author (Sept. 5, 2015) (on
file with author).
115. See E-mail from E.F. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author).
116. See, e.g., E-mail from J.R to author (Sept. 7, 2015) (on file with author).
117. See E-mail from S.C. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author).
118. See E-mail from E.F to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author).
119. See, e.g., E-mail from R.S. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author); Facebook
posting of H.B. (on file with author).
120. See Facebook posting of M.S. (on file with author).
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Some moot-court judges still seem to resist advocates who fail to
visually evoke the tall, masculine Classical warrior. One petite female
advocate reported being told that her argument was “adorable,” but that
she was “too short to be a litigator.” 121 Another petite female advocate
was told that the judge guessed the courts would need to implement step
stools now that so many women were becoming lawyers.122 Still another
petite female advocate was counseled to “take up more space” at the
podium. 123
It is not unusual for judges to focus their appearance- or demeanorbased comments solely on the female competitors. In one round of a
national specialty competition, a judge commented that a particular
female advocate “smiled too much.” 124 None of the male advocates
received feedback on their facial expressions. In the following round,
which was a semi-final elimination round, the panel of four older, male
judges provided no individual feedback, other than praising the female
advocate on one team for her “gold star smile” and telling the only other
female advocate—the same one who had been critiqued earlier for smiling
too much—to smile more. The team with the “gold star smile” won the
round and advanced to the finals. 125
Moot-court judges seem to echo the advice of moot-court texts that
short hair, or at least hair that is pulled back in a bun or twist so as to make
it appear to be short, looks more professional. Some moot-court programs
even require female advocates to wear their hair back. 126 Men are
counseled to have short hair; one judge—who himself was wearing a
large, heavy bracelet that clunked on the bench every time he gestured—
criticized one male advocate’s longer hair as “distracting” but “maybe ok
for a civil-rights lawyer or something.” 127 One former competitor reported
that a female judge subtracted five points from the competitor’s overall
oral-argument score because the competitor wore her shoulder-length hair
down and styled curly. 128
Just as Classical values cast the female speaker as either an
“androgyne” or as an “unnatural freak,” depending on whether she
presented in a more masculine way or a more feminine one,129 modern
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See Facebook posting of A.S. (on file with author).
See E-mail from A.M. to author (Sept. 15, 2016) (on file with author).
See E-mail from M.B. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author).
See E-mail from V.L. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author).
Id.
See E-mail from C.K. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author).
This author observed this particular incident.
See E-mail from J.O. to author (Sept. 16, 2016) (on file with author).
See supra Part II.A.
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female moot-court advocates have to walk a fine line or risk harsh critique.
One coach described a blond, exceptionally conventionally attractive
female advocate wearing a conservative skirt suit being chastised by a
male judge right out of the gate: “Don’t ever come into my courtroom and
smile at me like that ever again! Don’t think that you can sway a judge’s
opinion with your overt sex appeal. That is unprofessional.” 130 The
advocate had done nothing any of the other advocates had not done; she
had simply approached the podium and launched into her excellent oral
argument. She had not smiled, and she certainly had not been flirtatious.
At the same time, not being “feminine enough” poses a problem for some
advocates. Another coach recounted an argument he observed where a
female advocate whom he characterized as “present[ing] as a lesbian”
gave a confident argument. 131 Her opponent, a woman whose appearance
was more traditionally feminine, struggled to answer fairly predictable
questions. During the post-argument feedback, the judges told the first
woman that perhaps she could smile more (her argument required her to
defend the constitutionality of withholding hormone treatment for
transwomen, hardly an issue to smile about). By contrast, the judges
praised her opponent’s “thoughtfulness” and that she “took her time” to
answer a question. 132
And a female lawyer in a pantsuit still seems to unsettle a significant
number of moot-court judges, even in 2016. Coaches and female
competitors frequently reported women losing points for wearing
pantsuits, being chastised in post-argument feedback for wearing
pantsuits, or being subject to a school- or program-wide policy requiring
female competitors to wear skirt suits. 133
IV. ORAL ARGUMENT ABILITY IS “NATURAL”: MINDSET THEORY AND
STEREOTYPE THREAT
Aside from reinforcing the dress, demeanor, and delivery of the
white male as “neutral” and “non-distracting,” law school also perpetuates
the notion that certain abilities are inborn, innate, or natural—and thus, by
extension, inextricably bound up with other inborn traits such as sex, race,
130. See E-mail from G.B. to author (Sept. 5, 2015) (on file with author).
131. See E-mail from S.H. to author (Sept. 4, 2015) (on file with author).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., E-mail from L.C. to author (Sept. 14, 2016) (on file with author); E-mail from
S.H. to author (Sept. 15, 2016). I should note that this advice may reflect the real world, at least as it
existed in 2000. When I began my legal career at a large law firm in Los Angeles, other attorneys told
me that the firm had a policy that female lawyers were not to wear pants suits to federal court. And I
was told that the policy resulted from the policies of many of the judges in that court.
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ethnicity, sexuality, or some forms of disability—and perhaps nowhere is
this more true than in moot court. Section IV discusses mindset theory and
stereotype threat theory and posits that employing these theories in
teaching oral advocacy can help to sever the connection, at least in the
minds of future lawyers, between inborn traits and oral-advocacy skill.
A.

Mindset Theory

Psychologist Carol Dweck calls this implicit belief that intelligence
and talents are traits fixed at birth a “fixed” or “entity” mindset. 134 People
with this fixed mindset see failure or even struggles in their first efforts in
a particular area as an indicator of their innate abilities and their future
potential for success in that area. 135 Their goals relate more to
demonstrating and documenting—rather than developing—their
abilities. 136 This leads people with fixed mindsets to avoid activities that
might cause them to struggle or fail; instead, they will repeat tasks at
which they have performed well in the past. 137 And people with a fixed
mindset see effort as futile; why work hard if abilities are fixed at birth?138
Praise based on innate ability—rather than praise based on effort, on
successful implementation of feedback, or on developing sound strategies
for success—instill this fixed mindset. 139 Sometimes referred to as “ability
praise,” it attributes accomplishments to something innate and outside the
student’s control. 140 For example, praising a student who performs well
on a math exam by saying, “You are so smart! You are so good at math!”
reinforces the notion that an inborn intelligence and talent for math, rather
than practice and study, predetermined that outcome. 141
Moreover, an educator’s own implicit beliefs about talent and
intelligence can influence a student’s mindset. 142 Not surprisingly, an
individual’s implicit beliefs affect the type of feedback she provides; one

134. Carol S. Dweck & Ellen L. Leggett, A Social-Cognitive Approach to Motivation and
Personality, 95 PSYCHOL. REV. 256, 259 (1988); CAROL S. DWECK, MINDSET: THE NEW
PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS 11 (Ballantine Books 2006) [hereinafter MINDSET].
135. See Carrie Sperling & Susan Shapcott, Fixing Students’ Fixed Mindsets: Paving the Way
for Meaningful Assessment, 18 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 39, 54 (2012).
136. Dweck & Leggett, supra note 134, at 256.
137. MINDSET, supra note 134, at 108-09.
138. Id. at 112, 114, 148.
139. Id. at 83-90.
140. Id. at 71-73.
141. Id. at 169-70.
142. Sperling & Shapcott, supra note 135, at 7 (citing Kyunghee Lee, A Study of Teacher
Responses Based on Their Conceptions of Intelligence, 31 J. OF CLASSROOM INTERACTION 1, 9
(1996)).
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who believes that abilities are fixed at birth is more likely to give abilityoriented feedback. 143 A coach who praises a student as a “natural
advocate” or as being a “talented oralist,” for example, risks instilling or
reinforcing a fixed mindset in students. 144
An atmosphere that labels people based on “ability” can help induce
a fixed mindset, and an environment that values people based on external
indicia like grades or class ranking is the perfect breeding ground. 145 In
Mindset, Dweck provides an example of an environment most likely to
create a fixed mindset: a grade-school teacher seated students around the
classroom in order of IQ, and rewarded only the high-IQ students with
roles like carrying the flag, clapping the erasers, or ferrying notes to the
principal. 146
1. Law School Induces Fixed Mindsets, and Moot-Court Values
Can Exacerbate Them
Law schools arguably attract people more likely to have fixed
mindsets—law students are generally high achievers accustomed to being
praised for their intelligence and ability—but they almost certainly induce
fixed mindsets in their students and even their applicants. Law students
are selected, in part, based on their scores on the Law School Admissions
Test (LSAT), a test that purports to measure innate ability. 147 The Law
School Admissions Council—the entity that administers the LSAT—is so

143. Sperling & Shapcott, supra note 135, at 7 (citing Kyunghee Lee, A Study of Teacher
Responses Based on Their Conceptions of Intelligence, 31 J. OF CLASSROOM INTERACTION 1, 9
(1996)).
144. See Corie Rosen, The Method and the Message, 12 NEV. L.J. 160, 167 (2011).
145. MINDSET, supra note 134, at 16, 18, 141. See also id. at 167 (“[F]ocus on extrinsic
motivators is indicative of an environment that relies on ‘ability labeling,’ the process by which some
people are labeled as smart and others are labeled as less so—the basic contours of a structure that
promotes the entity mindset.”).
146. Id. at 6; Rosen, supra note 144, at 168.
147. About the LSAT, L. SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, INC., http://www.lsac.org/jd/lsat/about-thelsat [http://perma.cc/WBC3-2YL8] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (“[The LSAT] provides a standard
measure of acquired reading and verbal reasoning skills.”). Fortunately, there are signs of a trend
against this overreliance on the LSAT. Many law schools took advantage of a short-lived A.B.A.
program that allowed them to admit a limited number of students without LSAT scores. Delece SmithBarrow, As Law Schools Undergo Reform, Some Relax LSAT Requirements, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 2, 2015,
9:00
AM),
http://www.usnews.com/education/best-graduate-schools/top-lawschools/articles/2015/04/02/as-law-schools-undergo-reform-some-relax-lsat-requirements
[http://perma.cc/NSR2-R3Y9]. And Arizona Law, where this author teaches, recently received
permission to admit students using either GRE scores or LSAT scores. Elizabeth Olson, Law School
That Accepts GRE Scores Can Continue On, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/10/business/dealbook/law-school-that-accepts-gre-scores-cancontinue-on.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/CJH8-FECZ].
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certain that ability is fixed that it advises students that retaking the exam
is unlikely to produce a different score, even if the student were to study
diligently. 148 In fact, a student who materially raises his or her LSAT score
in a second administration risks being investigated for cheating. 149
Once a student reaches law school, the law-school culture cements
this notion that ability is innate. The belief that “success in law school is
exclusively demonstrated by high grades, appointment to a law review,
and similar academic honors” is “entirely obvious at most law schools,
whether elite or more typical.” 150 Grades in the first year of law school—
often primarily derived from a single exam in each class at the end of the
semester 151—determine eligibility for the high-status, high-paying jobs
that law schools program their students to value most (and that, quite
frankly, may be necessary to afford the student-loan debt many modern
law students carry). 152 Dweck’s scenario where the grade-school teacher
seated her students by IQ tests and reserved certain privileges for those
with the highest IQs eerily mirrors the typical law-school practice of
ranking students by GPA and granting the highest-ranking students
special indicia of status like law review membership. 153 Few would argue
that, in law school, grades and class rank function as labels of ability and
worth, and no environment is more likely to instill a belief that ability is
an entity fixed at birth. This belief even influences the prevailing method
for ranking law schools, which heavily weights the LSAT scores of
entering students, suggesting that one of the greatest indicators of a law

148. Repeating the LSAT, L. SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, INC., http://lsac.org/jd/lsat/repeatingthe-lsat [http://perma.cc/BG7E-66Q4] (last visited Sept. 5, 2017) (“If your score is a fairly accurate
reflection of your ability, it is unlikely that retaking the test will result in a substantially different
score.”); James D. Gordon III, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE L.J. 1679, 1682 (“The
LSAT people say that LSAT preparation courses do not help, since the LSAT tests knowledge and
skills that cannot be improved by last minute cramming.”); see also Sperling & Shapcott, supra note
135, at 68-69.
149. Repeating the LSAT, supra note 148 (“[U]nusually large score differences are routinely
reviewed by LSAC for misconduct or irregularity.”); see also Sperling & Shapcott, supra note 135,
at 69.
150. Lawrence S. Krieger, Institutional Denial About the Dark Side of Law School, and Fresh
Empirical Guidance for Constructively Breaking the Silence, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 112, 117 (2002).
151. Sperling & Shapcott, supra note 135, at 70 (citing Ron M. Aizen, Note, Four Ways to
Better 1L Assessments, 54 DUKE L.J. 765 (2004) and Steven Friedland, A Critical Inquiry Into the
Traditional Uses of Law School Evaluation, 23 PACE L. REV. 147 (2002)).
152. See Krieger, supra note 150, at 123 (“[Law students with the highest grades] immediately
and significantly shifted away from service-oriented career preferences and toward lucrative, highstatus career choices.”) and n.4 (acknowledging that high debt load may play a role in this
phenomenon, but asserting that it does not altogether explain it).
153. See Rosen, supra note 144, at 168.
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school’s quality is the inborn aptitude of the students it is able to attract
rather than anything that happens during the following three years. 154
The values of Classical rhetoric feed into this fixed mindset.
Quintillian, for example, believed that elite demeanor manifested good
character: “a good orator is a good man.” 155 Aristotle advanced the belief
that nature designated some men leaders from birth and others slaves. 156
One’s “natural” posture, gestures, and demeanor betrayed inborn qualities
of credibility and rationality; “good posture indicates the superiority of
mind.” 157 Similarly, so-called “popular” delivery and demeanor—less
restrained of gesture, more emotional and dramatic—reflected an inborn
inner nature tending toward vulnerability, cowardice, irrationality,
deception, and flight. 158
Modern advice on oral argument—particularly that focused on
demeanor and delivery—sometimes treats advocacy skill as “natural.”159
And moot-court coaches and judges may also fall into this trap, praising
a student as a “natural advocate” or having “talent” for oral argument.
2. The Antidote to a Fixed Mindset
Fortunately, however, mindsets are malleable. 160 In an early study,
Dweck and other researchers were able to manipulate children’s implicit
theories of intelligence by having them read passages that described the
abilities of certain famous people as either fixed at birth or shaped through
effort. 161 The children who read the passages describing intelligence as
malleable were more likely to demonstrate traits associated with a growth
154. See Jeffrey Evan Stake, The Interplay Between Law School Rankings, Reputations, and
Resource Allocation: Why Rankings Mislead, 81 IND. L.J. 229, 244 (2006). See also Sperling &
Shapcott, supra note 135, at 70.
155. See O’Regan, supra note 5, at 393.
156. Id. at 394 (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1254b25, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(Richard McKeon ed., Benjamin Jowett trans., Random House, Inc. 1941)).
157. O’Regan, supra note 5, at 393. Even Aristotle did allow for the occasional “soul in the
wrong body” conundrum, however. Id. at 394.
158. O’Regan, supra note 5, at 399, 403, 409.
159. See, e.g., DWORSKY, supra note 89, at 24 (“[Some people] naturally possess a strong,
confident, respectful-yet-conversational speaking style, naturally use effective gestures, facial
expressions, and vocal dynamics, and naturally are free of distracting vocal and bodily mannerisms .
. . .”); Lebovits et al., supra note 95, at 941 (asserting that some people have no talent for oratory;
some are gifted speakers); Eric J. Magnuson, Oral Argument – Learn by Listening, ROBINS KAPLAN
(Sept. 10, 2015), http://www.robinskaplan.com/resources/articles/briefly-oral-argument-learn-bylistening [http://perma.cc/SJB5-TVAE] (explaining that to some, oral advocacy is a “natural born
skill”).
160. Carol S. Dweck et al., Implicit Theories of Intelligence as Determinants of Achievement
Goal Choice (1982) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard Univ.).
161. Id.
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mindset, such as choosing a problem with learning goals as their next
assignment. 162 In another study with graduate students of business,
researchers split the students into two groups: one was given a fixed
mindset and told that the assigned task measured underlying capabilities,
and the other was given a growth mindset and told that management skills
were developed through practice.163 The fixed mindset group fell short;
the students in the growth mindset group “looked directly at their
mistakes, used the feedback, and altered their strategies accordingly.” 164
Just as a coach or professor with a fixed mindset, providing abilityoriented praise, can foster a fixed mindset in students, so can a coach or
professor with a growth mindset, providing praise that values learning and
effort, help instill the belief that abilities—such as oral advocacy skill—
are not inborn but rather malleable, 165 thereby helping to disconnect them
from other inborn traits like gender.
B.

The Role of Stereotype Threat and Self-fulfilling Prophecies

The phenomenon of stereotype threat likely exacerbates the impact
of ingrained assumptions about what a good advocate looks and sounds
like by making women and members of other groups perform more poorly
than they otherwise would. Stereotype threat refers to the “socialpsychological threat that arises when one is in a situation or doing
something for which a negative stereotype about one’s group applies.” 166
Social-science research suggests that stereotype threat causes the person
experiencing it to perform more poorly at the task than she ordinarily
would, often creating a cycle of diminished achievement in that area.
For example, in a series of studies, social scientists Claude Steele and
Joshua Aronson demonstrated that black students performed more poorly
on a series of verbal Graduate Record Exam (GRE) questions when they
were reminded of their race or they were told that the test measured
cognitive ability, a trait about which there are negative stereotypes
relating to black people.167 Simply asking the black students to identify
their race at the beginning of the test adversely affected performance;
black students not asked to provide racial or ethnic data either
162. Id.
163. MINDSET, supra note 134, at 111.
164. Id.
165. Dweck et al., supra note 160.
166. Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and
Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613, 614 (1997).
167. Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995).
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outperformed the white students or did just as well. 168 Where the students
were told that the test measured inherent intellectual ability, the black
students performed worse; where they were told that the same test
measured problem-solving skills, about which there are no negative
stereotypes about black people, the black students again performed as well
as or better than the white students. 169
A person can experience stereotype threat without any actual
prejudice or bias in the immediate environment. 170 Rather, to provoke
stereotype threat, a person generally need only be reminded of the
negative stereotype and its relevance to a given task. 171 Explicit
reminders—such as being required to fill in a bubble identifying one’s
race before taking a standardized test, for example—are not necessary;
however, simply being aware of the negative stereotype about a group to
which one belongs suffices to create a “threatening intellectual
environment” and trigger the negative effects of stereotype threat. 172 The
more that an individual experiencing stereotype threat thinks about the
negative stereotype, the more performance suffers.173 And the reminder
of the negative stereotype can take a variety of forms. For example,
women outnumbered by men in a testing room performed worse on a
series of GRE math questions than did women administered the same
questions in a single-sex environment. 174 The women were not asked
about gender or reminded in any other way of their gender or the
stereotype that women have poorer math skills. 175 Simply being
outnumbered by men in the testing environment was enough to invoke the
stereotype and cause the effects of stereotype threat.176 In fact, the
negative effects of stereotype threat increased to the extent that the women
were outnumbered; the greater the percentage of men in the room, the
worse the women performed. 177

168.
169.
170.

Id. at 801.
Id. at 805-06.
Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., An Identity Threat Perspective on Intervention, STEREOTYPE
THREAT: THEORY, PROCESS, AND APPLICATION 281 (Michael Inzlicht & Toni Schmader eds., 2012)
[hereinafter An Identity Threat Perspective].
171. Id.
172. Steele & Aronson, supra note 167, at 808.
173. Mara Cadinu et al., Why Do Women Underperform Under Stereotype Threat?: Evidence
for the Role of Negative Thinking, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 572 (2005).
174. Michael Inzlicht & Talia Ben-Zeev, A Threatening Intellectual Environment: Why Females
Are Susceptible to Experiencing Problem-Solving Deficits in the Presence of Males, 11 PSYCHOL.
SCI. 365, 368 (Sept. 2000).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 369.
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Countless studies over the past 20 years have demonstrated the
existence and effects of stereotype threat in a variety of situations
involving a variety of groups. 178 One particularly interesting study showed
that when Asian-American women were primed with reminders that they
were female (and therefore stereotypically bad at math) before taking a
math test, they performed worse than the control group; when another
group of Asian-American women were reminded that they were Asian
(and therefore stereotypically good at math) before the same test, they
performed better than the control group. 179
Sadly, simply working harder at a task or being more invested will
not help a person overcome the drag of stereotype threat; in fact, the
opposite appears to be true. The more that a person cares about performing
well at a given task, the more stereotype threat will hinder that
performance. 180 In a study of black students at a high school in Southern
California who were given a section of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT)
verbal exam, those students who self-identified as caring about academic
performance suffered the impact of stereotype threat significantly more
than those who self-identified as not caring about achieving in school.181
In fact, the black students who self-identified as not caring performed no
worse than did the white students who self-identified as caring. 182
Unfortunately, though, caring less does not seem to be the answer to the
dilemma: the black students who did not care about school still performed
quite poorly on the test, even without the impact of stereotype threat. 183
Moreover, stereotype threat is recursive; it creates a sucking
downward
spiral
where
each
stereotype-threat-provoked
178. See, e.g., Bettina Spencer & Emanuele Castano, Social Class is Dead. Long Live Social
Class! Stereotype Threat Among Low Socioeconomic Status Individuals, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 418
(2007) (observing effects of stereotype threat in academic performance of students of lower
socioeconomic class); Thomas M. Hess et al., The Impact of Stereotype Threat on Age Differences in
Memory Performance, 58 J. GERONTOL. B. PSYCHOL. SCI. SOC. SCI. P3 (2003) (observing effect of
stereotype threat on memory-test performance of older individuals). See also CLAUDE M. STEELE,
WHISTLING VIVALDI: HOW STEREOTYPES AFFECT US AND WHAT WE CAN DO 97 (2010) [hereinafter
VIVALDI] (“The effect [of stereotype threat] has been observed in women, African Americans, white
males, Latino Americans, third-grade American schoolgirls, Asian American students, European
males aspiring to be clinical psychologists . . . French college students, German grade school girls,
U.S. soldiers on army bases in Italy, women business school students, white and black athletes, older
Americans, and so on.”); Jonathan Feingold, Note, Racing Towards Color-Blindness: Stereotype
Threat and the Myth of Meritocracy, 3 GEO. J. L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 231, 238 (2011).
179. See Margaret Shih et al., Stereotype Susceptibility: Identity Salience and Shifts in
Quantitative Performance, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 80, 80-81 (1999).
180. VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 56.
181. Id. at 56-57.
182. Id. at 57.
183. Id.
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underperformance strengthens the negative power of the stereotype.184 An
early stumble leads a student to be labeled unskilled in a particular area.
Frustrations and apprehension about confirming the stereotype condemn
the student to realize her worst fears. The intensification of the negative
stereotype amplifies the risk of future failure, virtually assuring it.
Why and how does stereotype threat affect performance? Anxiety
plays a role; Steele concluded that the stress and anxiety added by the fear
of confirming a negative stereotype “leaves little mental capacity free for
anything else.” 185 Particularly where an individual’s group membership
makes her the minority in a particular group—a woman in an advancedlevel mathematics course, for example—researchers argue that the intense
pressure to represent one’s group favorably distracts the person from the
task at hand. 186 Studies have concluded that stereotype threat reduces
working-memory capacity, which makes it more difficult for individuals
to focus on and successfully complete tasks. 187 Stereotype threat is also
associated with physiological symptoms of heightened arousal like
elevated blood pressure. 188 One can easily imagine the effect that reduced
working memory and symptoms of heightened arousal could have on an
already-anxious oral advocate trying to think quickly, remember case
names and a court’s rationale, and respond effectively to rapid-fire
questions from the bench.
The flip side of stereotype threat is what some have called
“stereotype boost,” or “stereotype susceptibility”: knowledge of a positive
stereotype about one’s group can actually improve one’s performance in
the relevant area. 189 The improved performance of the Asian-American
female test subjects when subtly reminded of their Asian identity—and of
the stereotype that Asians excel at math—illustrated this phenomenon. 190

184. An Identity Threat Perspective, supra note 170, at 285-87; VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 176
(citing to Cohen et al., Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap: A Social-Psychological Intervention,
313 SCI. 1307 (2006)) [hereinafter Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap].
185. VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 123.
186. Delia S. Saenz, Token Status and Problem-Solving Deficits: Detrimental Effects of
Distinctiveness and Performance Monitoring, 12 SOC. COGNITION 61, 71-72 (1994).
187. Toni Schmader & Michael Johns, Converging Evidence That Stereotype Threat Reduces
Working Memory Capacity, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 440 (2003).
188. Jason W. Osborne, Gender, Stereotype Threat and Anxiety: Psychophysiological and
Cognitive Evidence, 8 J. RES. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 109 (2006); Jason W. Osborne, Linking Stereotype
Threat and Anxiety, 27 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 135 (2007).
189. Shih et al., supra note 179. See also Catherine Martin Christopher, Eye of the Beholder:
How Perception Management Can Counter Stereotype Threat Among Struggling Law Students, 53
DUQ. L. REV. 163, 169 (2015).
190. Shih et al., supra note 179.
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Another mirror image of stereotype threat is something labeled
“stereotype lift.” This occurs when a person gets a performance boost by
being reminded of a negative stereotype about another group’s
performance on a relevant task. 191 Unfortunately, this phenomenon most
benefits people who either “believe in the legitimacy of negative
stereotypes,” or are particularly invested in a hierarchy based in
membership in favored groups. 192 People with low self-esteem seem to
benefit more from stereotype lift, perhaps because they are more “likely
to make downward comparisons to protect their self-image.” 193
The way in which a professor, teacher, or other authority figure
delivers constructive feedback can also affect the impact of stereotype
threat. The most effective feedback both invokes high standards of
achievement and conveys a faith in the student’s ability to meet those
standards. 194 Called “wise feedback,” this mode of criticism proves
significantly more likely to elicit student trust in the feedback and less
likely to provoke the effects of stereotype threat than feedback delivered
neutrally, feedback delivered with a more generically reassuring
statement, or feedback that simply invoked high standard without an
accompanying expression of faith in the student’s ability to meet that
standard. 195
In one study, researchers had students write an essay that they were
told could be published in a campus magazine if it were good enough. 196
All of the students were given individualized critical feedback about the
grammar, style, and content of the essay. 197 They were also given a twoparagraph, handwritten, general critique that was identical for all
students. 198 One set of students was simply given this feedback. 199 A
second set of students was given the feedback with an introductory
statement that provided generic, bland encouragement like “overall, nice
job,” and “you have some interesting ideas in your [essay] and you make
some good points.” 200 The third set of students was given the feedback
191. Gregory M. Walton & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Stereotype Lift, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 456 (2003).
192. Id. at 464.
193. Id.
194. Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., The Mentor’s Dilemma: Providing Critical Feedback Across the
Racial Divide, 25 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 25, 1302 (1999) [hereinafter The
Mentor’s Dilemma]; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 162-63.
195. The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1304.
196. Id. at 1305.
197. Id. at 1306.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1307.
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with an introductory statement that stated that the reviewer was applying
high standards—an honest consideration of whether the essay was of
publishable quality—and that the reviewer would not have devoted such
time to the critique had the reviewer not believed that the student could
meet the high standards. 201 The black students who received the third type
of feedback were more likely to see the feedback as unbiased and
therefore trustworthy and were more motivated to incorporate that
feedback into their essays. 202
In Steele’s view, these results showed that “wise feedback”—
feedback that conveyed high standards and a belief in a student’s ability
to meet those standards—told the students that their reviewer was not
seeing them through the lens of any negative stereotypes about intellectual
ability. 203 As a result, the weight of stereotype threat lifted and could no
longer interfere with motivation or performance. 204 But one instance of
“wise feedback” is not necessarily enough:
In sustained relationships with students, the wise mentor . . . does not
simply speak of high expectations and a faith in students’ potential. He
or she also buttresses this message through expenditures of time and effort, by giving detailed attention to the student’s performance, and by
providing an empowering pattern of feedback over time. 205

Interestingly, exposing students to the incremental theory of
ability—instilling a growth mindset—also helps to counteract the impact
of stereotype threat. 206 In one study, researchers asked black and white
Stanford students to write letters to imaginary minority elementary-school
children in an economically disadvantaged area. 207 The researchers gave
the Stanford students a script detailing evidence of the malleability of
intelligence, of people improving their intellectual abilities through hard
work, and of changes that learning can create in the brain itself.208 The
black students, after reading this material and writing letters espousing the
incremental theory of ability, improved their grades in the following
semester. 209
201. Id. at 1306-07.
202. Id. at 1309-10.
203. VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 163 (citing to The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194).
204. VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 163 (citing to The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194).
205. The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1316.
206. See generally MINDSET, supra note 134; VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 169 (citing to
Aronson et al., Reducing the Effects of Stereotype Threat on African-American College Students by
Shaping Theories of Intelligence, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 113 (2002)).
207. VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 169 (citing to Aronson et al., supra note 206).
208. VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 169 (citing to Aronson et al., supra note 206).
209. VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 169 (citing to Aronson et al., supra note 206).
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Even something as simple as writing a brief self-affirmation can
reduce the impact of stereotype threat. 210 Near the beginning of the
academic year, researchers had teachers ask some of their seventh-grade
students to list a value they found most important and then draft a short
paragraph about why they found that value so important. 211 All but a few
of the highest performing black students improved their grades after this
exercise. 212 Black students not given the same affirmation exercise
experienced declining grades. 213 And this increase or decline persisted for
at least two years after the affirmation exercise. 214 Researchers concluded
that this exercise worked for two main reasons. First, the affirmation of
individual integrity and self-worth provided sort of a counter-narrative to
the negative stereotype, reducing the significance of the negative
stereotype. 215 Second, the self-affirmation “interrupted” the operation of
stereotype threat, lessening the impact of earlier poor performance or
evidence of stereotype. 216
V. TENSIONS AND BARRIERS TO CHANGE
Moot-court educators must navigate among several conflicting
values in determining how to deal with the pernicious stereotypes that
undergird much of the traditional advice regarding oral advocacy and
success in moot-court competitions.
First, we face a broader, more philosophical tension: should
marginalized groups “embrace the language of power, and risk being
coopted by it, or reject the language of power, and risk not being
heard?” 217 This same tension underlies the conflict between the equality
and difference models of feminism, but it is also instructive in thinking
about the dilemma facing most traditionally underrepresented groups. The
210. The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 172-73
(citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184).
211. The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1307-08; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at
174 (citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184).
212. The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1308; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 17475 (citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184).
213. The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1309; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 175
(citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184).
214. See The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1309; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at
175 (citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184).
215. The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1309; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 176
(citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184).
216. The Mentor’s Dilemma, supra note 194, at 1309; see also VIVALDI, supra note 178, at 176
(citing to Reducing the Racial Achievement Gap, supra note 184).
217. Kathryn M. Stanchi, Resistance Is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the
Law’s Marginalization of Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 7, 9-10 (1998).
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equality model of feminism holds that women only employ the demeanor,
intonations, and speech styles of the disempowered because they have
been socialized to do so; thus, women should emulate men in order to cast
off this negative socialization and unmask their hidden potential. 218 The
difference model of feminism, on the other hand, posits that these
disfavored speaking styles have no inherent fault.219 Rather, they are
disfavored and associated with lack of authority and power because they
are traditionally associated with women. 220 Therefore, we should embrace
the speaking style generally associated with women and accord it the
respect and authority it deserves, rather than seeking to train women to
speak more like white men. Moot-court educators need to make a
conscious choice regarding which side of the line they choose, and they
should provide their students with sufficient grounding in these theories
to make informed decisions as well.
Second, counseling advocates to adopt the demeanor and speaking
styles traditionally associated with authority may backfire: one linguistic
perspective—which shares some philosophical underpinnings with the
feminist dominance theory—suggests that, regardless of the speaker’s
demeanor or speaking style, the identity of the speaker and her gender,
race, and other traits determine whether her speech is valued. 221 For
example, a woman who speaks loudly and with assurance may be
characterized as “strident” or “combative,” whereas a man speaking in the
same way would be perceived as “confident” and “assertive.” Similarly,
a woman who pauses before answering a question may be seen as
“fumbling,” whereas a man pausing for the same length of time is
“thoughtful.” 222 Thus, a member of a traditionally marginalized group
who changes her presentation style to comport with common moot-court
advice risks making absolutely no difference in how moot-court judges
perceive her argument.
Third, moot court is supposed to simulate real appellate practice. And
law is—or at least it should be—a client-focused profession. 223 The
attorney’s personal beliefs, ego, and sensitivities must recede in the face
of the client’s cause. Thus, if it serves the client’s cause to pander to or
accommodate pernicious stereotypes—by, for example, wearing a demure

218. Id. at 48; see also Morrison, supra note 9, at 73-74.
219. Stanchi, supra note 217, at 49; Morrison, supra note 9, at 74-75.
220. Stanchi, supra note 217, at 48-49; Morrison, supra note 9, at 75.
221. Stanchi, supra note 217, at 49.
222. Example borrowed from Stanchi, supra note 217, at 49-50.
223. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rs. 1.0-1.18 (2016); see also Oral Advocacy and
Vocal Fry, supra note 92, at 6-7.
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navy-blue skirt suit rather than a maroon pantsuit, or straightening natural
African-American hair, or seeking elocution lessons to erase a regional
accent or modulate a high-pitched voice—is it not incumbent on the
attorney to pander and accommodate? Moot-court educators should
explicitly explore this tension with their students, again to enable their
students to make informed decisions regarding when and whether to
challenge stereotypes or transgress norms in their advocacy style.
Fourth, moot court can and should be a learning experience, but
teams (and their coaches and schools) also want to win. Many schools tout
their moot-court victories in alumni publications, in new-student
recruiting materials, in fundraising efforts, and on their websites. 224 At
least one entity ranks law schools by their win/loss records in moot court
and other legal-skills competitions, 225 and students interested in moot
court and other advocacy programs can consult those rankings in selecting
a school. If a coach knows that a certain presentation style, even one that
panders to and reinforces pernicious stereotypes, will make a student
advocate more successful at competition, does she not have an obligation
to coach the student to adopt that style? And a coach quickly loses
credibility with her team if judges blame behavior she condoned in
explaining why a team lost a round.
Finally, moot-court coaches often have limited autonomy and
discretion in how they coach students. At many schools, legal-writing
faculty run moot-court programs. And, at most schools, legal-writing
faculty are not eligible for tenure, often at the mercy of renewable shortterm contracts. 226 This lack of status and job security makes them
224. For example, UC Hastings College of Law touts that its Moot Court is ranked a top five
program in the nation for five years in a row. See Awards and Honors, UC HASTINGS COLL. OF L.,
http://www.uchastings.edu/academics/pro-skills-team/moot-court/intercollegiatecompetitions/Acheivements/index.php [http://perma.cc/XM2K-23B7] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
225. The University of Houston Law Center’s Andrews Kurth Moot Court National
Championship—billed as the “Moot Court Competition to determine the ‘best of the best’ Moot Court
programs”—has developed a scoring system to rank schools by their performance at different mootcourt competitions, based on factors like the type of award and the prestige of the competition. See
HOU.
L.
CTR.,
http://www.law.uh.edu/blakely/mcnc/rankings.asp
Rankings,
U.
[http://perma.cc/P8BE-9C5Y] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
226. At many institutions, legal-writing professors and other faculty who teach “skills” courses
often are accorded limited, if any, academic freedom, and they lack power even over their own
curriculum and pedagogical choices. As a result, skills faculty, and even directors of skills programs,
often must bow to faculty, administration, and student pressure regarding their curricular and
pedagogical choices. See Jo Anne Durako, Dismantling Hierarchies: Occupational Segregation of
Legal Writing Faculty in Law Schools: Separate and Unequal, 73 UMKC L. REV. 253, 267 (2004).
This is unlikely to change anytime soon. As of 2014, the majority of legal-writing professors and
directors still are not tenured or on the tenure track. LEGAL WRITING INST., ASS’N OF LEGAL WRITING
DIRS., REPORT OF THE ANNUAL LEGAL WRITING SURVEY, 64 (Sept. 12, 2017),
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vulnerable, particularly if their coaching methods and philosophies do not
produce winning teams, most particularly if students complain about this
perceived coaching failure. And a significant percentage of moot-court
coaches are adjunct professors or alumni volunteers with busy legal
careers, giving them even less time to reflect on the consequences of
coaching traditional moot-court demeanor and even less incentive to rock
the boat. Some moot-court coaches are third-year law students, who may
not have the knowledge, confidence, authority, or perspective to recognize
and correct advice that has more to do with outdated stereotypes than with
sound legal argument.
VI. A MENU OF SOLUTIONS
Twenty years have passed since Professor Morrison first challenged
moot-court programs to avoid perpetuating gender bias and other biases
in the profession by avoiding race- and gender-based language, raising
consciousness of gender bias in legal education and the profession, and
working to free students of stereotyped expectations. 227 But, as I have
discussed in Part II, little progress has been made in increasing access to
the highest echelons of the profession for women and other traditionally
underrepresented groups. And, as I have discussed in Part III, legal
education has and continues to contribute to that problem by reinforcing
the notion that the archetypal good lawyer or good oral advocate looks,
sounds, and acts like the Classical warrior, a role only available to upperclass white males. Thus, oral-advocacy educators must continue to
implement and indeed build upon Morrison’s suggestions. Although no
one solution answers every concern or resolves every tension, moot-court
faculty, coaches, and competition administrators can take several concrete
steps to mitigate the impact of bias and minimize the opportunities to
perpetuate bias.
A.

Suggestions for Educators

At the outset, these concerns argue for a moot-court program
primarily run by at least one full-time faculty member 228 who devotes a
http://lwionline.org/uploads/FileUpload/2014SurveyReportFinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/95B2-FZ67]
(showing that 42 out of 178 schools reported that some of their legal-writing faculty are tenured or
tenure track); id. at 35 (showing that 32 of 178 schools reported that the director of legal writing is
tenured or on the tenure track).
227. Morrison, supra note 9, at 81-83.
228. Ideally, this person—despite her focus on practical skills—would also be a tenured member
of the faculty. It is extraordinarily well documented that “legal education has a back of the bus, and
it’s legal writing.” Melissa H. Weresh, Stars Upon Thars: Evaluating the Discriminatory Impact of
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significant portion of her time to the study and teaching of advocacy, and
preferably one assisted by practitioners who devote their careers to
appellate advocacy. Moot-court programs exclusively run by students are
notorious hotbeds of bias perpetuation because they tend to value
oratorical flair over sophisticated, substantive argument. 229 Having a fulltime faculty member devoted to running a coherent advocacy program
also facilitates some of the other solutions outlined later in this section;
by developing a program that educates its faculty, coaches, judges, and
students in these theories and best practices, a full-time faculty member is
best positioned to implement a program-wide philosophy that best
balances the interests of preparing students for the realities of practice in
a biased profession while at the same time permitting a diverse array of
students to find effective voices as advocates and perhaps even become
agents for change in the profession.
A program that can be effective in this way must first educate its
faculty, coaches, and students in the key psychological theories of mindset
and stereotype threat. By translating the research about mindset theory
and stereotype threat into how they provide written and oral feedback to
advocates, coaches and professors can do much to undermine the notion
that the skills that make a good lawyer are inborn and inextricably tied to
one sex (or any other immutable trait). They can also disrupt the
stereotype-threat mechanism that turns negative stereotypes about women
ABA Standard 405(C) “Tenure-Like” Security of Position, 34 LAW & INEQ. 137, 146-47 (2016). As
discussed earlier in this Article, legal-writing faculty are seldom tenured. They are also
overwhelmingly female; as of 2013, approximately 73% of legal-writing faculty were female. Id. at
139. By contrast, a significant majority—at least 62%—of tenured faculty are men. Id. As Weresh
notes, when students observe this type of apparent gender bias, it sends a message to students about
their own future opportunities in the legal field, and it cannot help but reinforce the notion that roles
associated with women are less prestigious or desirable and that women are less qualified for the roles
that are more prestigious or desirable. Id. at 148.
229. See Michael Vitiello, Teaching Effective Oral Argument Skills: Forget About the Drama
Coach, 75 MISS. L.J. 869, 881-83 (2006). Some student-run programs have student boards that see
moot court as an area where less academically successful students can find a place to shine. This
means that students who did well in their first year of law school may be excluded from moot court
(or may choose activities like law review over moot court). Most second- and third-year law students,
particularly those who did not do as well in their first-year classes, likely lack the knowledge,
judgment, and experience to discern whether an oral argument is substantively strong or simply
delivered with flair, and so student boards select student competitors who may be heavy on style and
short on substance. Vitiello argues that these types of student-run programs risk perpetuating these
skewed values year after year as students select other students who share their values. Id. at 883. And
this likely also pollutes the judging pool, which often consists primarily of alumni of the school’s
moot-court program. Id. at 883-84. Moreover, students generally lack the real-world appellate
experience to know what real appellate courts value, or to appreciate the reality that the most stylish
oral argument cannot carry the day if the legal reasoning is flawed. See id. at 891-92; see also Alex
Kozinski, In Praise of Moot Court—NOT!, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 178, 185 (1997).
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lawyers into self-fulfilling prophecies that, in turn, perpetuate the
stereotype.
The research demonstrates that efforts to instill a growth or
incremental mindset in students can both avoid the pernicious effects of
the fixed mindset and neutralize stereotype threat. 230 Moot-court
educators should introduce their students and their team members to the
idea that talents and intelligence are incremental, rather than inborn, and
that individuals can improve their abilities and skills through effort.
Because praise based on “natural ability” helps foster the fixed mindset—
and because it likely also reinforces the idea that oral-advocacy ability is
inextricably linked with other inborn traits like race or gender—coaches
should avoid praising students as “natural speakers” or “born advocates.”
Rather, coaches should encourage the notion that oral advocacy is a skill
that can be learned and cultivated by focusing praise on how student effort
from practice session to practice session has improved that student’s
performance. Coaches—particularly those who have a professional record
of success in oral advocacy—can recount their own mistakes and
disappointments and describe techniques they used to improve their own
advocacy skills.
Another way educators might bolster a growth mindset would be to
educate moot-court board members, student coaches, and teaching
assistants about mindset theory and feedback techniques that instill a
growth mindset. Not only will this—like the letters the Stanford students
wrote to the fictional elementary-school students 231—reinforce the growth
mindset in the students learning and applying these techniques, it will also
ensure that the students receiving feedback are getting a uniform message,
at least in the moot-court program, that talents and abilities are not fixed
at birth.
Other solutions may involve implementing additional techniques
proven to counter stereotype threat. For example, coaches should consider
exploiting the stereotype-boost phenomenon and re-framing some oralargument tasks as ones at which women stereotypically excel when
coaching female students. For example, women are stereotypically better
at verbal tasks, like verbal memory and verbal fluency. 232 To provoke a
boost from this stereotype, coaches may try emphasizing how persuasive
230. See supra Part IV.
231. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
232. Einar M. Skaalvik & Richard J. Rankin, Gender Differences in Mathematics and Verbal
Achievement, Self-Perception and Motivation, 64 BRITISH J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 419 (1994); AnnCharlotte Smedler & Bertil Törestad, Verbal Intelligence: A Key to Basic Skills?, 22 EDUC. STUD.
343 (1996).
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precise word choice can be, or how the ability to accurately recall and
recount the key facts, holding, and reasoning of a significant case and
apply them to detailed facts of the case at hand can help the appellate
advocate respond to the court’s concerns most effectively. Similarly,
some stereotypes hold that women have better listening skills. 233 And few
things aid the appellate advocate more than listening attentively to—and
really hearing—the court’s questions and concerns. 234 Or coaches could
stress social sensitivity, which is the ability to read nonverbal cues,
another essential tool for advocates trying to assess whether a given
argument resonates with the bench, and another skill stereotypically
associated with women. 235
Educators can also take advantage of Steele’s “wise feedback”
philosophy, providing written and oral feedback that both communicates
that the coach sets high standards and conveys a personal belief in the
student’s ability to meet those standards. 236 Over the long term, wise
mentoring is hard work; it requires an investment of time and attention in
each individual student’s success. Not only does the wise mentor need to
deliver wise feedback consistently, she needs to communicate to each
student that she cares about that student’s success and believes in her
capacity to achieve. 237 Wise mentoring is not easy with every student—
coaches do not always connect on a personal level with each and every
individual—and it can be particularly challenging where the moot-court
coach is a time-strapped practitioner or a faculty member with a
burdensome course-load of labor-intensive skills classes. But the value it

233. Jennifer Romig, Do Men and Women Listen Differently?, LISTEN LIKE A LAWYER (Sept.
6,
2016),
https://listenlikealawyer.com/2016/09/06/do-men-and-women-listen-differently/
[http://perma.cc/54J6-NS8W] (“Despite the popular reception of gender asymmetry in the way we
talk with, listen to, and interact with one another, considerable research suggests that sex differences
may actually play only a minimal role.”) (citing Stephanie Lee Sargent & James B. Weaver III,
Listening Styles: Sex Differences in Perceptions of Self and Others, 17 INT’L J. LISTENING 5 (2003)).
234. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 87, at 191 (advocating careful listening to the
court’s questioning of self and of adversary); THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, supra note 88, at 16467 (stressing importance of listening to questions from court and to adversary’s argument); Interview
by Brian Garner with Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg (Nov. 13, 2006) (quoted in THE WINNING ORAL
ARGUMENT, supra note 88, at 165) (“You will do best if you concentrate on the questions you are
being asked.”); Hon. John Roberts, Address at the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference (July 13, 2006)
(quoted in THE WINNING ORAL ARGUMENT, supra note 88, at 165 (explaining that when asked what
he would do differently if he were an advocate again, Chief Justice Roberts replied that he would
“listen a little more carefully to what the questions are”)); Vitiello, supra note 229, at 887 (asserting
that what really matters in oral argument is ability to answer court’s questions thoroughly).
235. See Anne M. Koenig & Alice H. Eagly, Stereotype Threat in Men on a Test of Social
Sensitivity, 52 SEX ROLES 489 (2005).
236. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text.
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can provide to students and to shaping a more just and accessible
profession make it worth the effort.
Because the research shows that simple self-affirmation exercises
can neutralize the impact of stereotype threat, 238 moot-court educators
might take a page from the playbook of their clinical colleagues and have
students and team members write short, periodic reflection papers or
journal entries 239 that identify a student’s transcendent values and goals
and how she is applying those values and working toward those goals
through her work in moot court. 240
In teaching students in moot-court classes or in coaching teams,
professors and coaches can and should expose students to the advice of
oral-advocacy experts and to the teachings of Classical rhetoric. Building
on Professor Morrison’s suggestions that fall in the vein of “teaching the
controversy,” 241 professors and coaches should encourage students to
think critically about the biases and cultural contexts that underlies this
advice, particularly when it comes to dress, demeanor, and delivery. We
should teach a “critical moot court” that interrogates the biases behind
assumptions about what makes a good oral advocate and permits students
to make informed choices about which approaches they wish to adopt and
why. In this way, professors and coaches may strike a balance between
preparing students for the realities of current law practice and arming
students to change what the voice of authority sounds like in the legal
profession.
Many experts on oral advocacy counsel students to “be yourself.” 242
Although this advice may seem glib, it has particular merit when partnered
with other advice. For example, the tale of vocal fry shows us that
attempting to lower one’s voice below its natural register may backfire; a
coach may counsel a student that, generally, studies have shown that
people find lower voices more pleasing, but only to the extent that the
lower voice falls within the speaker’s natural vocal range. 243 Gestures
should not seem calculated but should fit with the speaker’s inflection,

238. See supra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
239. See Karen Hinett, Developing Reflective Practice in Legal Education, UK CTR. FOR LEGAL
EDUC.
(2002),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.203.2556&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[http://perma.cc/R37H-JEFN].
240. Doing so might also enhance learning in other ways, stimulating metacognition. Hinett,
supra note 239 at 7. And taking advantage of the opportunity for professional-identity formation.
241. Morrison, supra note 9, at 56.
242. See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 87, at 142.
243. See supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
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intonation, and expression. 244 An advocate will be most persuasive when
she seems genuine, and extreme changes to voice and demeanor can ring
false with an audience.
When it comes to competition teams in particular, issues related to
implicit bias and the teaching opportunities that arise from bad or unfair
judging make it especially important that at least one coach—preferably
an adjunct or full-time faculty member, but at least a practitioner volunteer
rather than a student—attend the competition with each team. Most
competitions permit coaches to sit at the back of the courtroom during
competition rounds. Coaches should take notes during the arguments, of
course, to provide formative feedback to the students. But coaches should
also take notes during the post-argument feedback from the judges. If a
coach disagrees with a particular item of feedback from the bench, or if a
coach fears that a student will misinterpret that feedback because of the
manner in which it was delivered or because of that particular student’s
personality, the coach should take time between argument rounds to
discuss that feedback with the students during a debriefing session.
Coaches who observe objectionable, bias-driven behavior by judges
during a competition round should report that behavior to the competition
administrators, preferably in writing, but perhaps also orally and in person
(particularly if the behavior is egregious). Some competition
administrators actually provide comment forms. If the competition does
not, a letter documenting the behavior in detail—including concrete
examples and quotations, where appropriate—will suffice. Provide
examples and quotations if possible. If a competition has systemic
problems with judges being unprepared or manifesting bias, consider not
returning to that competition the following year—and tell the competition
organizers why your team will not be returning.
And, of course, professors and coaches must be scrupulously attuned
to their own unjust biases and avoid letting them influence interactions
with students. Every professor and coach should explore the Project
Implicit website, for example, and maybe even take the Implicit
Association Test (IAT). 245 Most people whom this author knows who
have taken the test report being surprised by implicit biases of which they
were not consciously aware but which made sense to them upon further
reflection and self-examination. The mere fact that an educator is herself
244. See Oral Argument and Impression Management, supra note 88, at 645-46 (stating that
research on nonverbal communication suggests that smiles, nods, and gestures can be more persuasive
than their absence, but must be “synchronized with and supportive of the vocal/verbal stream”).
245. Preliminary Information, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
takeatest.html [http://perma.cc/H9TC-VKGR] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
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female, of course, does not mean that she does not harbor implicit—or
explicit—biases against certain traditionally female traits, or that she does
not inadvertently reward or deter conduct-based sex and gender
stereotypes.
B.

Suggestions for Competition Administrators

Moot-court competitions may be the most challenging arena for
change. Finding enough lawyers and judges willing to volunteer hours of
their time to prepare for and judge rounds of moot-court oral argument—
particularly a large competition with many competitors and many rounds,
requiring sometimes nearly a hundred judges—can be time-consuming
and challenging. And moot-court judges often participate in these
competitions because they have strong feelings about what a good oral
advocate looks, sounds, and acts like. But educators, student moot-court
boards, and others who administer intramural or intermural moot-court
competitions can take several steps to prevent judges and others from
reinforcing pernicious stereotypes about what a good lawyer looks and
sounds like.
The first and perhaps most challenging step—and one that arguably
enhances the academic impact of moot court overall—is to shift the focus
from style to substance. Placing more emphasis on accurate and
thoughtful discussion of the law, apt and accurate answers to questions
from the bench, and demonstrated understanding of the legal, factual, and
policy issues the problem implicates can help eliminate some of the more
subjective elements of moot-court judging. Many competitions already do
much to bring substance to the forefront. For example, in most
competitions, the brief score comprises up to 50% of an advocate’s overall
score, and this often persists through final rounds of competition. 246 As a
general rule, brief scorers have no information about the name, sex, race,
ethnicity, religion, or sexuality of the brief’s author.247 Often, the brief
246. See A.B.A. NAT’L APPELLATE ADVOCACY COMPETITION RULES art. 11(3)(f)-(g) (2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/law_students/20152016NAACRules.authcheckdam.pdf. [http://perma.cc/DF56-ZFBE] [hereinafter A.B.A. RULES]. See
also JEFFREY G. MILLER NAT’L ENVTL. LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION OFFICIAL RULES r.
V(B)(2) n.4 (2017), http://www.law.pace.edu/sites/default/files/NELMCC/2017_Official_Rules.pdf.
[http://perma.cc/Q7MB-SEWA] [hereinafter PACE RULES]; NAT’L NATIVE AM. LAW STUDENTS
ASS’N ANNUAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION OFFICIAL RULES Appendix A(4) (2015),
http://media.wix.com/ugd/c50703_2f8f3c46d6b148a6b753eea0fb974ec4.pdf [http://perma.cc/BB2J5BVW] [hereinafter NALSA RULES].
247. See A.B.A. RULES, supra note 246, art. 11(1). See also PHILIP C. JESSUP INT’L LAW MOOT
COURT
COMPETITION
OFFICIAL
RULES
r.
6.15
(2017),
https://www.ilsa.org/
jessup/jessup17/2017%20Rules%20Final%20PDF.pdf. [http://perma.cc/X3GN-2KZX] [hereinafter
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score affects initial pairings in oral argument rounds; much like the
ranking system in the college basketball tournament, teams are seeded
based on brief score, and then teams with higher brief scores compete
against teams with lower brief scores in the initial oral-argument
rounds. 248 This makes it more difficult for a team with a flashy oralargument style but weak grasp of the substance to take advantage of an
ill-prepared or superficial bench to vault over a more substantively strong
team.
Many competitions also use scoring rubrics to shift the focus from
style to substance. Substantive issues—such as knowledge of the law,
knowledge of the record, and responses to questions from the bench—
increasingly make up a larger percentage of the overall score, with
categories like demeanor, speaking style, and courtroom presence
receiving as little as 10% or 20% of the overall point total. The risk of
rubrics, however, is that they may mask particularly pernicious bias; a
judge may conscientiously believe that she is allocating points for
knowledge of the law when, in fact, she is allocating points for how well
she perceived a competitor to have communicated that knowledge, and
that perception may be influenced by implicit bias.
Competition administrators also can do more to encourage and
enable judges to reward a strong substantive legal argument over a more
superficially pleasing one. Many moot-court critics identify poor judging
as the biggest obstacle to achieving the exercise’s pedagogical goals. 249
And the biggest obstacle to good judging may be poor preparation. Illprepared judges who have only a superficial understanding of the legal
and factual issues involved often “reward cleverness and poise over
persuasiveness and sound argumentation.” 250 Judges who are not
thoroughly familiar with the record or the law either recognize that they
cannot accurately assess the substantive arguments and therefore fall back
on easy, canned comments about style or demeanor, or they risk being
bamboozled by an advocate who delivers inaccurate or oversimplified
legal arguments with confidence and panache. 251 In fact, as much as
possible, the best moot-court judges approach the moot argument as they
would if they were real judges who needed to decide real legal
JESSUP RULES]; PACE RULES, supra note 246, r. III(C); NALSA RULES, supra note 246, rs. 5.4(a),
8.4(a).
248. See A.B.A. RULES, supra note 246, art. 8(1)(c). See also JESSUP RULES, supra note 247, r.
8; NALSA RULES, supra note 246, r. 9.8(a).
249. See e.g., Barbara Kritchevsky, Judging: The Missing Piece of the Moot Court Puzzle, 37
U. MEM. L. REV. 45 (2006); Vitiello, supra note 229; Kozinski, supra note 229.
250. Kritchevsky, supra note 249, at 49.
251. Id. at 48-49.
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arguments. 252 Although the moot-court judge should avoid scoring the
advocates based on which side might win in a real case, the judge should
focus on how much the advocate’s argument would assist a real court in
arriving at a just decision rather than on whether an argument was
delivered with flair or panache.
Possibly the most important thing a competition administrator can do
to encourage judges to focus on substance is to create a simple and
achievable problem. Many who draft problems for moot-court
competitions seem to strive to make them as complex and challenging as
possible, introducing students (and judges) to labyrinthine statutory
schemes, complicated interactions between different areas of law, and
cutting-edge issues. Although, of course, a competition wants to present
an intellectual challenge to students, and the problem should be interesting
to both students and judges, the difficulty arises when judges—often busy
attorneys and judges with little time to prepare, working from bench
memos and case summaries—attempt to get their heads around these
complex issues in a short period of time. This makes it difficult for those
judges to distinguish between a glib but confident argument and a more
nuanced and accurate presentation of the type that would be more likely
to carry the day in a real appellate court. In creating problems and bench
memos, then, competition administrators should focus on making the key
legal and factual issues ones that busy lawyers and judges can quickly
assimilate.
Even relatively simple legal issues can involve dozens of lengthy
cases that a student might cite, and often specialty competitions focused
on niche areas of law have little choice but to delve into complex issues.
Moreover, a problem that is too simple risks failing to engage both the
students and the judges. Creating a closed-universe problem—that is, one
where all the necessary sources of law are provided with the assigning
materials—permits a competition to create an intellectually challenging
problem while making it easier for the competition to prepare judges to
accurately assess any cases students might cite or arguments students
might assert. It deprives the students of all of the skill-building experience
that conducting the research would provide, but that might be a small but
necessary price to pay to improve the overall quality of judging.
Even with a complex, open-universe problem, competition
administrators can build better-prepared benches by providing exhaustive
briefing and training before the competition. Yes, this will be timeconsuming, and yes, recruiting an adequate number of qualified judges is
252.
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challenging enough when they simply must attend a couple of hours of
arguments and read a bench memo. That said, if you offer your judges a
free, high-quality presentation on the legal issues involved in your mootcourt problem, and if you work with your state bar to offer those judges
hours of Continuing Legal Education (CLE) credit for that session, you
may find that you are actually able to recruit more judges and that those
judges will be better prepared to assess and score the arguments and
provide good, substantive feedback. Some states will permit you to offer
CLE credit for judging the arguments themselves and even for some
preparation time, which also helps busy attorneys justify devoting their
time to the endeavor. Creating a webinar or other online course will make
it even more convenient for your judges to access the content that you
provide on their own time.
This focus on substance over style does not mean, of course, that
competition judges should not penalize competitors for communicating
disrespect for the court through demeanor, word choice, or tone, or for
using overly casual language or gratuitous slang or profanity in oral
argument. But scoring rubrics and judge-training materials should provide
clear and concrete examples of the kinds of conduct that should and
should not result in point deductions in those categories. And scoring
rubrics and judge-training materials should warn judges against letting
superficial and inoffensive style and demeanor issues affect scoring in
substantive areas. These materials also should strongly discourage judges
from commenting on the physical appearance or dress of the advocates.
Competition administrators can also help judges to avoid acting on
implicit bias by making judges aware of their own biases. The judging
memo or CLE materials can include a link to the Project Implicit website
where judges can take the IAT, which identifies biases individuals often
do not even realize they possess. 253 Simply exposing them to the test and
the website can make your judges more aware of the impact of implicit
bias and the fact that even well-meaning people can harbor pernicious
biases based on immutable traits like race or gender. 254 A caution: do not
try to use the IAT to pre-screen judges for bias. The test’s creators
admonish that the IAT was not designed for that purpose, and using it for
that purpose “could lead to undesired and unjustified consequences.” 255
253. PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit [http://perma.cc/R8GY-NBDB]
(last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
254. Overview, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html
[http://perma.cc/KW6R-EHYZ] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
255. Ethical Considerations, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/
ethics.html [http://perma.cc/N93A-NK3W] (last visited Sept. 12, 2017).
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And, just like coaches and students, judges can be educated on
mindset theory and stereotype threat and encouraged to deliver feedback
that fosters a growth mindset and conveys belief in a student’s ability to
meet high standards. You might include brief materials on the theories in
your judging memo or CLE packet, and you can model how to frame
feedback there, as well.
Even with all of this planning and preparation, judges may behave
badly. Judges may honestly disagree with the competition’s philosophy
regarding comments on demeanor and appearance, or judges may be illprepared or difficult. Competition organizers should develop systems to
monitor judges—providing team coaches with comment cards is one good
method—and counsel judges who make inappropriate comments. Should
a judge remain intractable or display gross bias or prejudice toward a
competitor because of an innate trait, the competition should not ask that
judge to return. This can be difficult when a judge is a significant donor
or a luminary within the legal community, so competition organizers
should make sure that key stakeholders understand and buy into the
competition’s philosophy regarding these issues.
VII.CONCLUSION
Moot-court competitions, programs, and exercises present one of the
first opportunities for law students to try on a professional identity and to
contemplate what it means to look, sound, and act like a lawyer. As mootcourt educators, judges, competition directors, and board members, we
have the opportunity and obligation to teach students that the voice of
authority in the legal profession comes in a variety of pitches and physical
packages. We need not discard the lessons of Classical rhetoric—although
we may challenge a few—but we should deliver them with an
acknowledgment of the context from which they arose, a context in which
women’s voices were largely silenced, at least in the public sphere. This
can only increase access to all aspects of the profession, not just for
women but for members of all groups traditionally marginalized both in
law school and in the legal profession.
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